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The Internet these days is like a box of cyber-chocolates: You can
try searching for the information you want, but you just never
know what you're gonna get. Over the past four years, numerous
commentators' have promised that, by providing access to accurate
and pertinent information about candidates and public policy
issues, the Internet2 will reform the American political system.
However, the 1996 election-the first in which the Internet played
a significant role 3 -demonstrated that despite politicians' eagerness to exploit the new medium, cyberspace was not yet prepared
to shoulder the responsibilities required of a savior of representative democracy. Although the Internet is still in relative infancy,
its role in this important area of American life reveals the problems
its unique features have engendered. Judicial adjudication of these
controversies sheds light on the ability of legal institutions to
control the impact of this chaotic medium.
While prospects for World Wide Web commerce have advertisers
and retailers drooling, the Web's promise to be a cheap tool by
which politicians can target messages to millions of voters has yet
to be realized. Instead, picture this scenario: It's the 1996 presidential primary season and you are a conscientious voter who
wants to find out who the candidates are and what they stand for."

' See, e.g., GRAEME BROWNING, ELECTRONIC DEMOCRACY: USING THE INTERNET To
INFLUENCE AMERICAN POLITICS (1996); LAWRENCE K GROSSMAN, THE ELECTRONIC REPUBLIC:
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1995); Farai Chideye, Recipe for Apathy,
11 MEDIA STUD. J. 83 (1997); Mark Hall, One to One Politics in Cyberspace, 11 MEDIA STUD.
J. 97 (1997); Jim Warren, Foreword to CHRIS CASEY, THE HILL ON THE NET, at xi, xii-xvi
(1996); Mark S. Bonchek, Grassroots in Cyberspace (visited Mar. 20, 1998)
<http'J/www.ai.mit.edu/people/msb/pubs/grassroots.html> (paper presented at the Annual
Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Ass'n, Chicago, Apr. 6, 1995); Steven L. Clift,
Putting Pen to Paper: Electronic Democracy, Write On! (visited Mar. 20, 1998)
<httpJ/www.simonsays.com/titles/0671568507/trail.html>.
2
If you still don't know what the Internet is, see ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830-38
(E.D. Pa. 1996), afld 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997) (explaining the creation, development, operation,
and regulation of the Internet); and Barry M. Leiner et al., A Brief History of the Internet
(visited Mar. 20, 1998) <httpJ/www.isoc.org/internet-history/brief.html> (describing the
origins and evolution of the Internet).
' See Adam Clayton Powell III, Lethargy '96-Campaign '96 On Line (visited Mar. 20,
1998) <http/www.fac.org/publicat/campaign/lth96powon.htm>.
' Of course, this would likely make you an irrational voter and would definitely put you
among the minority of the electorate, since most voters make a rational determination that
the process of seeking information about candidates is simply too costly and thus refrain
from procuring any information whatsoever. See ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY
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You have heard the media trumpeting the Information Superhighway5 for its plethora of political information. So you log onto the
Net, boot up your free copy of Netscape, and begin searching for the
leading candidates' Web sites. First you try typing potential
domain names6 into your browser with the hope of stumbling upon
a candidate's home page. You try "http://www.dole.org." Unfortunately, this address is being used by an Internet service provider
that hosts, among other things, home pages of three gay and
lesbian organizations.7
So next you check out "http://
www.dole.com'--and you end up at the home page of the pineapple
company! Now you are beginning to get agitated.
Perhaps "http://www.dole96.org" might work. This site looks
much more promising. Entitled "Bob Dole for President," and
covered with high-quality, patriotic, red, white, and blue graphics
featuring the Senator and his familiar conservative themes, the

OF DEMOCRACY 260-76 (1957). The rational voter "is likely to rely purely on the stream of
free information he receives in the course of his nonpolitical pursuits .... He will not even
utilize all the free information available, since assimilating it takes time." Id. at 245.
Because the incremental benefit gained from voting is generally less than the cost of
obtaining all the information necessary to make a truly informed choice, many citizens prefer
to remain "rationally ignorant." DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 11205-06 (1989). And,
since the possibility that an election will be decided by a single vote is infinitesimally small,
the rational voter has little incentive to inform himself-or even to vote at all. See DOWNS,
supra, at 244.
Of course, the Internet has the potential to lower the costs of information searching, thus
potentially increasing the number of informed voters. The Internet also promises to reduce
the costs related to group organization. See Bonchek, supra note 1, § 5.8.
'"Information Superhighway" is a popular term for the Internet that Vice President Al
Gore claims to have coined. See Daniel Pearl, Colliding Cliches and Other Mishaps on the
Term Pike, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 1994, at Al.
'Domain names are "mnemonic, alphanumeric, user-friendly alternatives to the numeric
Internet protocol (IP) addresses by which computers refer to one another." Jon H. Oram,
Case Note, The Costs of Confusion in Cyberspace, 107 YALE L.J. 869, 869 (1997). A fully
qualified domain name consists of three parts, delimited by periods: from right to left, the
top-level domain (e.g., ".org"), the second-level domain ("dole96"), and the name of the
individual server (e.g., "www"). See Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1230-3 1,
40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1412, 1414-15 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Kenneth Sutherlin Dueker, Note,
Trademark Law Lost in Cyberspace: Trademark Protection for Internet Addresses, 9 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 483, 492-97 (1996). For more discussion of domain names, see infra Part II.
'See Cyber Spaces-Clients (visited Mar. 20, 1998) <http'J/www.dole.org/cyberspaces
html/clients.html>.
aSee Dole Food Company, Inc. (visited Mar. 20, 1998) <http'J/www.dole.com/
mainbod.htm>.
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Web site contains hyperlinks9 to Senator Dole's positions on issues
such as crime, drugs, terrorism, and family values. The site
apparently also offers polling data, the campaign's latest TV spot,
a press release on California Governor Pete Wilson's endorsement
of Dole, and a form that allows visitors to sign up for the campaign
mailing list.'0 Once you look past the snazzy graphics and officialsounding domain name, however, you notice this statement:
Bob Dole, of course, is the founder of the Dole Fruit
Company and a popular Senator. Mr. Dole loves
tropical fruits, especially slightly over-ripe bananas
which are just starting to turn black and mushy, but not
so black and mushy as to be inedible. Mr. Dole is also
very fond of apricots, which aren't so tropical, despite
years of effort by the Dole Fruit Company's best scientists.',
All of a sudden you realize you've been fooled. The site is actually
a spoof of the real Dole campaign site, and a pretty convincing one

Hyperlinks, or links, are
highlighted text or images that, when selected by the user, permit him to

view another, related Web document. Because Web servers are linked to the
Internet through a common communications protocol, known as hypertext
transfer protocol ("HTI?"), a user can move seamlessly between documents,
regardless of their location; when a user viewing a document located on one
server selects a link to a document located elsewhere, the browser will
automatically contact the second server and display the document.
Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citation omitted), affd Reno v. ACLU,
117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
" See Bob Dole for President (visited Mar. 20, 1998) <http'J/www.archive.orgtpres96/
parody/dole961.htm>. The Smithsonian Institute has corroborated with a group called the
Internet Archive to establish an excellent World Wide Web archive of materials from the

1996 presidential election, including candidate Web sites, political media coverage, and even
the parody sites themselves (in different stages of development). Given the ephemeral
nature of World Wide Web sites, this site is an excellent resource for the countless number
of researchers who will inevitably be studying the first ever Internet presidential campaign.
See Internet Archive, Web Archive 96 (visited Mar. 20, 1998) <httpJ/www.archive.org/
smithsonian.html>.

" See Bob Dole for President, supra note 10.
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at that. 12 Perhaps you will eventually discover that the actual
Dole site is located at "http://www.dole96.com." (Note the difference: The top-level domain is ".com," not ".org," despite the fact that
the campaign is not a commercial business 3 ). Or maybe you get
so fed up with looking that you simply quit your search. Or
perhaps you never figured out that the parody Web page was not
actually the real thing, and you left the site seriously believing that
Senator Dole once had to fight with the ruler of Turkey because the
Turks weren't eating enough bananas. 4 Regardless, if it remains
this difficult to locate bona fide political information on the World
Wide Web, voters will refuse to utilize this new communications
medium as a way to learn about the candidates. 5 This isn't an
Information Superhighway. It's stop-and-go, bumper-to-bumper
traffic-with a significant number of accidents along the route.
In an effort to define the appropriate relationship between
politics, voters, and the Internet, this Article analyzes the issue of
political parody on the World Wide Web within the context of
existing legal rules. The Internet has already proved itself to be a

12

Were you fooled, you would not have been alone. Victims of the parody included

numerous Web surfers, not to mention America Online and the New York Times. See infra
notes 107-111 and accompanying text; see also Al Cross, ErrorHas Republicans Weaving
Tangled Web, COURIER-J. (LouIsvILLE), Apr. 28, 1996, at 2A (chronicling the Kentucky
Republican Party's embarrassment arising from its mistaken link to the parody Clinton
page).
"sNetwork Solutions, Inc., the company that currently maintains the system of domain
name registration, see infra notes 87-89, "allows non-profit corporations, as well as for-profit
businesses and individuals, to use the '.com' designation.' Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am.,
Inc. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1430, 1437 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
14See Bob Dole for President,supra note 10.
15 Even the so-called search engines are of little assistance. Try entering "Dole," 'Bob
Dole" or "Dole campaign" on one of the top Web search engines, AltaVista. The queries
return 25,064, 23,957, and 2702 possible site locations respectively. Search of Altavista
<http://altavista.digital.com> (Mar. 20, 1998). These search engines have no ability to
distinguish between parody and the real thing;, they simply match text.
Yahoo!,
<httpJ/www.yahoo.com>, an Internet directory, is more promising because it organizes sites
according to content (i.e., the indexing is done by real live human beings). However, unlike
AltaVista, Yahoo! does not search the Web for every document in cyberspace. Rather, Yahoo!
requires that Web site owners notify it of the existence of their sites, and often lets site
owners choose which category they would like to be listed under. Thus, often a Yahoo!
search will be as inclusive and up-to-date-and better organized-as an Altavista search.
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hotbed of trademark, 8 copyright, 17 commercial misappropria20
19
tion,1 8 and unfair competition abuses, as well as defamation,

'a See, e.g., Dow Jones & Co. v. WSJ, Inc., 133 F.3d 906 (2d Cir. 1998) (dispute over
"wallstreetjournal.com"); Academy of Motion Picture Arts & Sciences v. Network Solutions,
Inc., No. CV 97-6394-LEWMCX, 1997 WL 810472 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 1997) (dispute over,
inter alia, "academyaward.com," "academyawards.net," "oscar.net," and "theoscars.net");
Interstellar Starship Servs., Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 1331, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1304
(D. Or. 1997) (dispute over "epix.com"); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc.,
No. CV 96-7438 DDP (ANX), 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (dispute over
"skunkworks.com"); Juno Online Serys., L.P. v. Juno Lighting, Inc., 979 F. Supp. 684, 44
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1913 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (dispute over "juno.com"); Desknet Sys., Inc. v.
Desknet, Inc., 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1954 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (dispute over "desknet.com");
Trustees of Columbia Univ. v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 964 F. Supp. 733, 43
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (dispute over "columbia.net"); Planned Parenthood

Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1430 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (dispute over

.plannedparenthood.com"); Digital Equip. Corp. v. Altavista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456 (D.
Mass. 1997) (dispute over "altavista.com"); Cardservice Intl, Inc. v. McGee, 950 F. Supp. 737,
42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1850 (E.D. Va. 1997) (dispute over "cardservice.com"); Hearst Corp. v.
Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620 (PKL) (AJP) 1997 WL 97097 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997) (dispute
over "esqwire.com"); Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. 11. 1996) (dispute
over "intermatic.com"); Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1338 (E.D. Mo. 1996)
(dispute over "goldmail.com"); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., 939 F. Supp.
1032, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1746 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (dispute over "playmen.it").
" See, e.g., Playboy Enters. v. Webbworld, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1171,45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1641 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (claiming that the defendants impermissibly reproduced, distributed,
and displayed images identical to those published in the plaintiffs magazines); Playboy
Enters. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (alleging copyright
infringement against a bulletin board system operator for dissemination of copyrighted
photographs); Marobie-FL, Inc. v. National Ass'n of Fire Equip. Distribs., 983 F. Supp. 1167,
45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1236 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (claiming that defendants made plaintiffs
copyrighted "clip art" available to be downloaded by Web users); Religious Tech. Ctr. v.
Lerma, 908 F. Supp 1353 (E.D. Va. 1995) (alleging copyright infringement based on
dissemination of works owned by plaintiff, a religious organization); Religious Tech. Ctr. v.
Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545
(N.D. Cal. 1995) (claiming copyright infringement against operator of a computer bulletin
board service and an Internet access provider for copyright infringement committed by a
BBS subscriber); see also Pamela Samuelson, Will the Copyright Office Be Obsolete in the
Twenty-First Century?, 13 CARDoZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 55 (1994) (arguing that the Internet
will require profound changes in the law of copyright, perhaps resulting the demise of this
area of law).
"s See, e.g., National Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1585 (2d Cir. 1997) (alleging commercial misappropriation against the manufacturer
and promoter of hand-held pagers that provided real-time information about NBA games);
Expert Pages v. Buckalew, No. C-97-2109-VRW, 1997 WL 488011, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6,
1997) (adjudicating claims that the defendant made an unauthorized copy of a Web site he
designed "for the purpose of sending electronic mail messages[I to persons advertising on the
site"); Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. America Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(involving "e-mail bombing," also known as "spamming"); CardserviceInt'l, Inc., 950 F. Supp.
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negligence,22 infringement of publicity and privacy
and other allegedly tortious acts. 24 Traditionally, courts

at 738-39 (discussing a dispute over "cardservice.com"); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. F.A.C.T.Net,
Inc., 945 F. Supp. 1470 (D. Colo. 1996) (alleging trade secret misappropriation against
parties who had posted the plaintiffs materials on Internet without authorization);
Doubleclick, Inc. v. Henderson, No. 116914/97, 1997 WL 731413 (N.Y. Co. Ct. Nov. 7, 1997)
(alleging trade secret misappropriation).
'9 Almost every claim of federal trademark infringement will also include a claim of
unfair competition. Thus, nearly all of the cases cited at supra note 16 include unfair
competition claims. See, e.g., Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1338; Chuckleberry Publ'g,Inc., 939
F. Supp. at 1034; Cyber Promotions,Inc., 948 F. Supp. at 437; CardserviceInt'l, Inc., 950 F.
Supp. at 739; Hearst Corp., 1997 WL 97097 at *5; see also Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc.,
130 F.3d 414, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1928 (9th Cir. 1997) (alleging trademark infringement
and unfair competition).
20 See, e.g., Hornell Brewing Co. v. Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court, 133 F.3d 1087, 45
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1458 (8th Cir. 1998) (alleging defamation against a brewery that used the
image of Crazy Horse, the spiritual and political leader of the Lakota people who opposed
the use of alcohol, to advertise malt liquor over the Internet); Telco Communications v. An
Apple a Day, 977 F. Supp. 404 (E.D. Va. 1997) (subjecting defendant to personal jurisdiction
for posting allegedly defamatory press releases on its Web site); EDIAS Software Int'l, L.L.C.
v. Basis Int'l, Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413 (D. Ariz. 1996) (claiming that defendant allegedly sent
defamatory electronic mail messages and made defamatory Web site postings); Cubby, Inc.
v. Compuserve, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 139-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that defendant cannot
be liable for defamation on its system where it did not and could not have known of the
existence of the defamatory statements); Worldnet Software Co. v. Gannett Satellite Info.
Network, Inc., No. C-960869, 1997 WL 603378 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 5, 1997) (alleging
defamation and libel based on a newspaper report and a television broadcast).
21See, e.g., Patmont Motor Werks, Inc. v. Gateway Marine, Inc., No. C. 97-2703 TEH,
1997 WL 811770 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 1997) (describing how a former business partner used
a Web site as a forum for disparaging the plaintiff and its product); Worldnet Software Co.,
1997 WL 603378, at *1; Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL
323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (finding Prodigy liable as a publisher because it held
itself out as controlling the content of its services and because it used software to
automatically pre-screen messages that were offensive or in bad taste); It's in the Cards, Inc.
v. Fuschetto, 535 N.W.2d 11 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (dismissing defamation action based on
statements posted on a bulletin board feature of a computer network service for memorabilia
dealers).
22 See, e.g., Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) (dismissing
suit
against America Online, Inc. that alleged that AOL knew about but failed to remove
defamatory postings).
' See, e.g., HornellBrewing Co., 133 F.3d at 1089 (alleging defamation for the use of the
plaintiffs spiritual and political leader's name in the advertising of malt liquor on the
Internet); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (holding that, under the
circumstances, the accused had a reasonable, albeit limited, expectation of privacy in e-mail
messages that he sent and received over a computer subscription service); Stern v. Delphi
Internet Servs. Corp., 626 N.Y.S.2d 694 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (dismissing complaint against
a company that used a celebrity's name and picture to advertise its electronic bulletin board
for debate on celebrity's candidacy for office of governor).
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have afforded parody substantial First Amendment protection,2
often times providing humorists with virtual immunity against
26 and defamation.2 1
claims of intellectual property infringement
However, in an effort to clamp down on improper Internet behavior,
courts have interpreted existing legal rules broadly. This practice
allows judges to apply precedents from traditional media to offenses
that occur in cyberspace. Unfortunately, this judicial finesse often
leads to the manipulation of legal doctrine,' and thereby threatens to eviscerate much of the First Amendment protection that
parody and satire have earned in other contexts. While few would
argue with the proposition that the Internet is fraught with
trademark and copyright infringement, swiftly-conceived and

overly-broad rules represent a danger to political parody as it exists
in the emerging world of cyberspace.
As a nation of netizens,2 9 we face conflicting pressures both for
and against regulation and judicial interference in this area. 0
This Article explores the legal status of political parody on the
Internet and suggests possible solutions designed to facilitate
access to online information in order to create a healthier, better
informed, and more engaged citizenry,"' while simultaneously

See, e.g., United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir.' 1997) (prosecuting
defendant for transmitting interstate communications containing threats to kidnap or injure
another person); Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d at 416 (alleging fraud and RICO violations); Cody
v. Ward, 954 F. Supp. 43 (D. Conn. 1997) (alleging fraudulent misrepresentation via
electronic mail and a Prodigy bulletin board); Telco Communications, 977 F. Supp. at 405
(alleging tortious interference with contractual relationships and reasonable business
expectations).

See infra Part III.
" See infra Sections III.A.-C.

25
27

See infra Subsection III.D.I.

' Cf Oram, supra note 6, at 869 (arguing that manipulating and finessing traditional
trademark principles threatens to misallocate the "costs of confusion" involved in navigating
the Internet).
2 See Gerald F. Seib, DigitalAmerica: How Cybervoters Log On Politics, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 12, 1997, at A24 (reporting on Republican pollster Frank Luntz's study regarding the
demographics and characteristics of "Connected Americans").
-1 Of course, this issue parallels the hotly-debated question of whether the government
can or should regulate indecent speech on the Internet. There is similar tension between the
desire to promote free speech values and the need to protect children from online
pornography. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997) (holding certain provisions of the
Communications Decency Act unconstitutional under the First Amendment).
"' Cf Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV.
245, 255 ("Self-government can exist only insofar as the voters acquire the intelligence,
integrity, sensitivity, and generous devotion to the general welfare that, in theory, casting
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preserving free speech values. Part I of this Article investigates
the relationship between politics and the Internet, its brief history,
and its future potential. Part II explains the controversy over
access to preferred domain names such as "dole96.org." Part III
considers possible causes of action that the "rightful" owner of a
domain name might have against these unauthorized parodies, and
the viability of the so-called "parody defense." Part IV analyzes the
Internet's unique features, and asks whether, and if so how, these
characteristics change the context of existing legal rules. Finally,
Part V proposes possible solutions, both public and private, legal
and technological, designed to advance free expression and bring
about the informed electorate necessary to meet the rigorous
demands of democratic self-government.32
I. POLITICS IN CYBERSPACE
A. THE PROMISE OF THE INTERNET

The Internet has the potential to radically alter the nature of
American political campaigns-for better and for worse. Today, in
nearly every electoral contest, campaigns produce truckloads of
literature describing their candidates' backgrounds and positions on
the hot issues. Yet most of this material goes unread, often
unnoticed, by the voters. Unfortunately, it is difficult and timeconsuming for even the most conscientious voter to find and read
through it all.33 Although organizations such as the League of

a ballot is assumed to express."); Lillian R. Bevier, Give and Take: Public Use as Due
Compensationin Pruneyard,64 U. CHI. L. REV. 71, 80 (1997) ("A viable democracy requires
a politically well informed, active, and engaged citizenry."); Kim Alexander, Voter Education
and the Internet 1 2 (Mar. 15, 1997) <http'J/www.iupui.edu/-epackard/elecnet/papers/
kimalexl.html> ("Those of us who share a vision of a healthier, more informed and more
engaged citizenry must act now to make that vision a reality .... [b]y supporting efforts to
create online tools that give citizens access to information that allows them to participate in
public life in a meaningful way.").
3 See ALEXANDER MEI.EJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
25 (1948) ("The voters... must be made as wise as possible. The welfare of the community
requires that those who decide issues shall understand them. They must know what they
are voting about.") .
' This is consistent with the concept of "bounded rationality." Individuals do not always
seek to maximize their personal welfare. Rather, most of the time they simply try to do their
best given their limited time, information, and cognitive abilities. See generally 1 HERBERT
A. SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND PUBLIC POLICY
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Women Voters can collect and disseminate information through
voter guides, mailing and production costs limit both the quality
and distribution of their efforts.34 Furthermore, the costs of
organization prevent all but the best-financed groups from having
any significant voice in the political process. As a result, voters
often make relatively uninformed choices not because candidates
are unwilling to reach out to them, but because the process of
becoming informed simply requires too much effort.35
The Internet, on the other hand, offers candidates the opportunity to reach out to thousands, if not millions, of voters with superior
information and high-quality propaganda-and at relatively
minimal cost. For just a few thousand dollars, a politician can
maintain electronic communications with her core supporters,
thereby strengthening her campaign organization." In addition,
she can use the Internet to reach those voters who have yet to
make up their minds; and ideally, voters can easily locate whatever
information about the candidates they desire. Moreover, studies
have shown that Internet users are much more likely to vote than
the average citizen.
Thus, the demographics of netizens make
them a key swing voter group, and Web sites provide candidates
with an effective method of persuasion.
In fact, the Internet has already been credited as a decisive factor
in three recent federal elections: the January 1996 special election
of Oregon Senator Ron Wyden,"8 the late Rep. Walter Capps's (DCA) successful challenge of incumbent Rep. Andrea Seastrand, 39

(1982) (discussing "rational choice under uncertainty"). Since it is difficult to obtain perfect
information about all the candidates on the ballot, most voters make a rational decision
based on whatever information is easy to obtain, rather than engage in the arduous process
of becoming adequately informed in order to make a rational choice.
' See Alexander, supra note 31, J 5.
' See id. 1 4.
86See Bonchek, supra note 1, § 7.
37See
BROWNING, supra note 1, at 5; see also Seib, supra note 29 (describing Republican
pollster Frank Luntz's conclusion that "Connected Americans" are more likely to say they
always vote than are non-connected Americans).
s8 See BROWNING, supra note 1, at 2. ("Wyden won his race by less than 18,000 votes, a
measurable proportion of them supplied by voters attracted to Wyden's candidacy though his
Internet appeals, activists believe.")
39See California Voter Found., Contested California House Seat May Be Decided in
Cyberspace 1 3 (Nov. 8, 1996) <httpJ/calvoter.orgcvf/pr/Nov8.html>. Capps's Webmaster
believes the campaign site was visited about 20,000 times over the course of the election.
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and Rep. Ellen Tauscher's (D-CA) victory against incumbent Rep.
Bill Baker.4 ° In each of these races, pundits have claimed that
the World Wide Web may have provided the victorious candidate
with the slight edge he or she needed to win.
Unlike the telephone, which primarily supports one-to-one
communication, or radio and television, where information flows in
a single direction towards a passive audience, the Internet allows
for truly interactive discourse between candidates, interest groups,
and voters. 4 ' A report presented to the American Political Science
Association in September 1994 illustrates its potential:
For optimists, political participation in cyberspace
approximates an ideal type of communitarian democracy
that emphasizes mutuality ....

The time and money

needed to become informed about any topic drop substantially when citizens can employ ... servers to locate

and retrieve desired information on a vast variety of
topics, including matters of public policy that comprise
the formal business of government. Mass democracy,
whether conceived of as an adversarial contest among
competing interests, a unitary process for building
consensus, or some combination of the two, becomes
feasible.42

'The Web site greatly raised our campaign's visibility .... If the Capps campaign had a Web
site in 1994 (Capps was then running as an incumbent, and was defeated by Seastrand),
Walter might have been running as an incumbent this year rather than as a challenger."

Id. 1 7. His opponent did not have a Web presence.
' See id. 1 3. It is important to note that the elections of Capps and Tauscher
represented successful challenges against incumbent U.S. Representatives, who are generally
very difficult to defeat. Incumbents are typically re-elected at astounding rates, often by
lopsided margins of victory. See LINDA L. FOWLER, CANDIDATES, CONGRESS, AND THE
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 74-78 (1993); GARY JACOBSON, THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL

ELECTIONS 19-28 (1997). Voters' typical lack of information about the competing House
candidates often leads to "fairly unrelieved party-line voting" and therefore little incumbent
turnover. See Donald E. Stokes & Warren E. Miller, Party Government and the Saliency of
Congress, in ELECTIONS AND THE POLITICAL ORDER 194, 194-211 (Angus Campbell et al. eds.,
1967).
41
See BROWNING, supra note 1, at 5.
42 Bonnie Fisher et al., A New Way of Talking Politics:Democracy on the Internet (paper

presented at the 1994 American Political Science Ass'n conference, New York, Sept. 1-4,
1994) <httpJ/www.nwnet.net/netcetera/sep94iapsa.txt>.
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The potential for this type of mutual exchange is unlimited, and
rather astonishing, especially given the current lack of interaction
between government and the people. Today, despite the cries of
many in politics and the media, the Internet is "more than a place
to find pictures of people having sex with dogs." 3 For example,
during the online protest against Internet censorship, an estimated
65,000 to 100,000 netizens read regular legislative updates about
the Communications Decency Act" ("CDA") within three to four
days of each update's posting.4 5 The result of this political
dialogue was a six-inch-thick petition signed electronically by

112,000 voters who opposed the CDA. Senator Patrick Leahy (DVT) presented the petition on the Senate floor in June 1995.46
This incident provides a perfect example of how, in its ideal form,
Internet communication affords citizens the opportunity to express
their opinions to their representatives while at the same time
providing politicians with a mechanism for promoting them-

selves.47
"3Philip Elmer-DeWitt, On a Screen Near You: Cyberporn, TIME MAG., July 3, 1995, at
38. But cf. Pet Pleasure (visited Mar. 20, 1998) <http/www.petpleasure.comlmain.html>
(purporting to be "the most bizarre collection of animal lust on the Net").
4 47 U.S.C. § 230 (Supp. 1996). Parts of the CDA were struck down as unconstitutional
in Reno v. ACLU,117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
"aSee BROWNING, supra note 1, at 6.
46 See id.; see also 141 CONG. REc. 58341 (daily ed. June 14, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Leahy) (claiming to have received 35,000 separate petitions from concerned netizens). The
other often-invoked example of the Internet's potential to change the world of politics
involves Rich Cowan, a 32-year old former campus protester, who ran a nationwide campaign
to organize a day of over one hundred campus protests against the Republican Party's
Contract with America-from his basement. See Bonchek, supra note 1, § 1.
'"Many members of Congress now rely on the Internet to maintain communications with
their constituents back home. As of March 1998, 95 of the 100 U.S. Senators, and 347 of the
435 Representatives had Web sites. Three years ago, only 10 senators and four representa.
tives were online. See Kara G. Morrison, Savvy Constituents Pull Congress to the Web,
OMAHA WoRLD-HERAL, Mar. 7, 1998, at 1. According to an American University survey,
58% of the members of Congress actually use the Internet regularly, and 97% of their
legislative staff use it to gather online information. See id. However, while 90% of
congressional offices receive e-mail, only 6.5% consistently respond electronically to e-mail
correspondence. Each Web page has its own "personal touches." Some offices provide
humorous quotes about or by members of Congress, while others post their replies to
constituent questions. See id. However, some have criticized Congress for using the Web
for "putting up (public relations) material and fluff and garbage" instead of useful
information such as voting records and the full text of all proposed congressional bills. Id.
(quoting Gary Ruskin, director of the Congressional Accountability Project, a one-man
Washington watchdog operation).
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While many have recognized the Web's potential for changing the
nature of political discourse, the reality is that the transformation
is already well underway. The Internet played an important role
in the 1996 election, in terms of linking candidates with the media,
voters with the candidates, and, perhaps most notably, the media
with the voters.48 During that election, the World Wide Web was
used to register voters,49 provide interactive polling, 0 assemble
links to thousands of candidate Web sites to facilitate votercandidate interaction, 5 monitor campaign contributions,52 and
educate the electorate via both partisan 3 and non-partisan'
messages. But was this plethora of information actually reaching
the voters themselves, or was it all just media hype? The numbers
are still rather modest, but the Voters News Service has estimated
that 26% of 1996 voters were regular Internet users.55 The Pew
Research Center has reported that in 1996 "lalbout 21 million
Americans (12% of the voting-age population) obtained political or
policy news from online sources." 5 As many as 10% of the
sample polled stated that they received at least some election

" There are many excellent sources on the World Wide Web that chronicle the role of
cyberspace in the 1996 campaign season. Among the best are Gary Gach, The Campaign
Trail 96 - Online, (visited Mar. 20, 1998) <httpJ/www.simonsays.com/titles/0671568507/
trail.html>; Internet Archive, supra note 10; and Powell, supra note 3.
" See, e.g., Rock the Vote, Welcome to Rock the Vote (visited Mar. 20, 1998) <httpJ/
www.rockthevote.org>.
' See, e.g., Democracy Place USA (visited Mar. 20, 1998) <http'//soundprint.org/
-democracy/>; Votelink, Votelink Home Page (visited Mar. 20, 1998) <http'J/
www.votelink.com>.
"' See, e.g., USWeb, Campaign '96 Online - A Guide to Politics on the Internet (visited
Mar. 20, 1998) <http'J/campaign.96.com>.
'2 See, e.g., California Voter Found., Late Contribution Watch (visited Mar. 20, 1998)
<http'I/www.calvoter.orgcvf/96gen/lcwatch.html>.
See Internet Archive, Presidential Candidates (visited Mar. 20, 1998)
<http'i/www.archive.org/smithsonian.html#president> (listing general election sites for
various presidential candidates).
' See, e.g., Project Vote Smart, United States Congress (visited Mar. 20, 1998)
<http://www.archive.org/pres96/VOTSMART/index.htm>.
'See California Voter Found., supra note 39, 1 5.
"Pew Research Ctr., One.in-Ten Voters Online For Campaign '96 1 2 (visited Mar. 20,
1998) <http'J/www.people-press.org/tec96sum.htm>.
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information from the Net. 7 In addition, 8% visited sites sponsored by candidates or political parties, and 3% said that the
Internet was their principal source of campaign information. 8
Individuals polled responded that they were specifically looking
to the Internet for information that was not available in traditional
media sources, and appreciated "the convenience of getting political
material online." 9 The Internet was not only used for tracking
the Presidential election, but, to a surprising extent, for information on congressional and local races as well.6' Estimates are that
half of the electorate could be online by the 2000 election,6 ' and
politicians thinking ahead towards that date have already begun
preparations.62
C. THE MIS-STEPS:

1996

In conjunction with these unique benefits, however, come serious
problems inherent to the new technology. While cyberspace offers
revolutionary opportunities to reform both the ways in which
candidates reach their constituents and voters access political
information, the Net also provides a "uniquely effective means of
57 See id.

" See CNN AllPolitics, Study: Halfof Voters Could Be Online in 2000 1 4 (Jan. 24, 1997)
<http://allpolitics.com/1997/01/24/new.media/index.html>. Post-election polls revealed that
more voters visited the Clinton-Gore site than Dole-Kemp, see Pew Research Ctr., supra note
56, 18, despite the fact that the incumbents' site went online more than six months after
their challengers'.
"Pew Research Ctr., supra note 56, 1 5.
"See id. 1 6.
l See CNN AllPolitics, supra note 58, I 3.
' Friends of Vice President Al Gore have already registered several domain names in
anticipation of Gore's inevitable candidacy in 2000. A group called "Gore 2000 Internet" has
registered gore2000.com and a group called "Friends of Al Gore" has registered
"gore2000.org." However, Brooks Talley has already registered "gore00.org" and has plans
for yet another parody site. To find out who has registered individual domain names, see
InterNIC, Web Interface to Whois (visited Mar. 20, 1998) <httpJ/rs.internic.net/cgibin/whois>. An individual parodist-to-be has already registered "gephardt2000.org" to be the
"Karl" Gephardt for President home page. See InterNIC, Whois Query Results (visited Mar.
20, 1998) <http'//rs.internic.net/cgi-bin/whois?gephardt2000.org>. The bidding has already
begun for "forbes2000.com," which is being auctioned off by the current registrant to the
highest bidder (reportedly at a price approaching five digits). See Laurence Arnold, What's
in a Name? Bidding Begins for Forbes2000.com, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 1998, at A4. Many
domain names that include the names of potential presidential candidates are already being
sold on the open market. See id.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 1998

15

482

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 6

J. INTELL. PROP. L.

[Vol. 5:467

anonymous attack" for any individual or group interested in
maligning a candidate.'
Although the closest thing to online
dirty tricks in the last presidential election were the parody Web
sites that appeared on the Internet in late 1995, 64 one can imagine
the possibilities for deception and mischief the technically skilled
might pursue to promote their own political agendas. Meanwhile,
in other contexts, the Web has already been used as a platform for
scandal-mongering 65 and vicious political attacks."
Though unrelated to politics, 6 7 a recent case illustrates the risks
intrinsic to the new medium. As part of a malicious hoax, in April
1995, an unknown individual affixed Kenneth Zeran's name and
telephone number to a series of notices on an America Online
("AOL") bulletin board advertising t-shirts and other items
emblazoned with slogans that glorified the Oklahoma City bombing
attack." Predictably, Zeran was inundated with disturbing and
threatening calls from outraged Net users.6 9 The rumor spread
rapidly to newspaper reporters and to an Oklahoma City radio
station.70 Unable to clear his name or find his attacker, Zeran
sued AOL. The district court, however, granted AOL's request for
judgment on the pleadings on the ground that a provision in the
newly-enacted federal Telecommunications Act 7' allows online

Alison Frankel, On Line on the Hook, AM. LAw., Oct. 1995, at 58.
See supra Section I.B.

See, e.g., Howard Kurtz, Gatheringof the Diatribes:ArmchairCriticsLet Loose On-Line,
WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 1996, at D1; Now, EOB: Enemies of Bill, WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 1995, at

B7.

6 See, e.g., Suzanne Keating, Web Site Spurs Feud in Athol, TELEGRAM
& GAzETTE, Mar.
12, 1997, at Al (reporting on a local education advocate's use of the Web to attack
conservative school board candidates with charges of "incest, drug and alcohol abuse and [the
community's] supposed lack of support for education").
67
Although the incident seems most likely to be a personal or perhaps commercial attack,
one of the advertisements in question did include the slogan "McVeigh for President 1996."
Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1124, 1127 n.3 (E.D. Va. 1997), aftd 129 F.3d
327 (4th Cir. 1997). Still, a successful political parody argument seems highly unlikely,
considering the obvious malice involved in this online attack and the fact that the defendant
was not a "public figure." Cf New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)
(announcing the "public figure" doctrine).

ss See Zeran, 958 F. Supp. at 1127.

" See id.
70 See id. at 1127-28.
7' 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)

(Supp. 1996).
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service providers to escape liability for negligent distribution.72
Thus, Zeran was left without a remedy for the wrong he had
suffered.
In the anonymous world of cyberspace, any user could employ
similar tactics to link a candidate with an unpopular issue, group,
or individual in order to create the appearance that the message is
in fact coming from the candidate herself. Ironically, the benefits
promised by the Internet-most notably, the fact that the World
Wide Web allows one to publish high-quality campaign materials
at a relatively low cost-make this problem all the more difficult to
solve. The skilled Web site artist can easily construct a parody or
hoax site that looks as good as, or perhaps better than, the real
thing. On the Net, all candidates and non-candidates alike are
inherently equal-at least in terms of their abilities to reach and
persuade the voters.73
Perhaps the most serious problem faced by this emerging
marketplace of ideas is the congestion and sheer overload of
information available online. While the Internet does provide a
surfeit of invaluable knowledge and important facts, the valuable
information often comes hidden amongst an abundance of "outdated, unreliable or just plain useless information."74 The Web is an
anarchic example of disorganized communications mayhem. There
are more than one million sites registered with unique Internet
addresses," and more than 900,000 end with the familiar ".com"
suffix. 76 Even the Internet search engines," which are designed

7 See Zeran, 958 F. Supp. at 1135.

Of course, this may change dramatically as new technology develops. Currently there
are a limited number of things a Web site can do, and none requires much technical
expertise (although Internet consultants generally charge as though they do). If you have
the know-how, you can still publish a top quality Web page with only a computer, a $19.95

Internet connection, some Web publishing software, and a day's work. However, as the
Internet matures, it is possible that newly-developed Internet functions could require
significant capital investment or technical expertise. Under such a scenario, once not

everyone can build a top-quality Web page, this problem of confusion over which site is the
parody and which is the real thing could significantly diminish. See infra Section V.C.
7' Michael Newman, Conquering the Web, Prrr. POST-GAZETrE, Mar. 16, 1997, at D1.
'8 See Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Network Solutions Shares Surge 30 Percent in IPO, WASH.

POST, Sept. 27, 1997, at C1.
7
See Newman, supra note 74.
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to help Web users find what they are looking for, are overwhelmed.
For example, try searching Altavista for the phrases "Dole for
President" or "Clinton and Lincoln Bedroom" and see how many
documents you get.7" Without a better way to separate the wheat
from the chaff, searching the Internet can be frustrating, especially
for the Net novice.79 Thus, the conscientious voter still faces the
same problem: The overabundance of online information often
demands too much effort for one to become adequately informed.
One tool that in theory ought to help users locate information
online is the domain name, ° or URL, 1 which headlines and
identifies each home page. Analogous to local street address, a
Web site's domain name provides a way for Internet users to jump
directly to a particular location without having to traverse a myriad
of links or wade through an overflow of search engine results.
Instead, users can simply type the address into their Web browsers.
Domain names offer a user friendly means by which to distinguish
and locate various computers, users, files, and other resources

" Search engines allow a user to type in key words which describe what he or she is
searching for, and the site returns the addresses of all pages which contain those key words,
often sorted by some sort of mathematical formula which considers the frequency and
location of the words. These sites include Yahoo! <http://www.yahoo.com>; Excite
<http://www.excite.com>;
Webcrawler <http://www.webcrawler.com>;
Lycos
<http://www.lycos.com>; and Altavista <httpJ/altavista.digital.com>.
78As of this writing, a query of "Dole for President" produced 410,332 documents, while
"Clinton and Lincoln Bedroom" yielded 1,999,129.
Search of Altavista <http://
altavista.digital.com> (Apr. 1, 1998).
See Newman, supra note 74.
'o A domain name is generally divided into three (though occasionally four) fields
separated by periods, known to netizens as "dots." For example: "www.stanford.edu." The
fields designate subdomains, from right to left. The rightmost field is called the top-level
domain, designating the type of organization to which the address belongs (in this example
.edu is for educational institutions). Many top-level domains serve as country designators,
such as ".uk" for the United Kingdom and ".it" for Italy. Network Solutions, Inc. currently
allocates second-level domain names (i.e., the "stanford" portion) within the five major toplevel domains. See infra notes 84-96 and accompanying text. The owner of the second-level
domain can allocate first-level domains within his site as he or she chooses. For example,
Stanford University's Web presence includes "www.stanford.edu," "rescomp.stanford.edu,"
"tickets.stanford.edu," "kzsu.stanford.edu," and many others. For a technical explanation of
the function of domain names, see Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. Ill.
1996); and Dan L. Burk, TrademarksAlong the Infobahn: A FirstLook at the Emerging Law
of Cybermarks, 1 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 1 10-15 (Apr. 10, 1995) <httpJ/www.urich.edul-jolt1
vlil/burk.html>.
" "URL" stands for Uniform Resource Locator.
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attached to the Net; essentially they serve as a mnemonic substitute for the numeric Internet protocol (IP) addresses by which
computers communicate.8 2 In theory, these Net addresses should
allow a user to quickly navigate the Internet, particularly when the
user knows what she is looking for. However, as the next part
indicates, this ideal has yet to come to fruition.
II. THE DISPUTE OVER DOMAIN NAMES

Like every other aspect of the Internet, the system of domain
name registration remains virtually unregulated and thus somewhat chaotic. To date, the process of laying claim to a particular
domain has been governed by the rule of "first come, first
served. " ' Under a franchise established by the National Science
Foundation (NSF) (the Internet's original "owner"),' a consortium
of organizations called the InterNIC 5 currently holds a monopoly
on all ".com," ".net," ".org," ".edu," and ".gov" domains." Distribution of domain names is administered by Network Solutions, Inc.
(NSI), a for-profit Virginia corporation, though that will likely
change in the near future: 7 Until September 1996, NSI main' See Burk, supra note 80, It 10, 12.
83Michael D. Scott, Advertising in Cyberspace: Business and Legal Considerations,COMP.
LAW., Sept. 1995, at 1, 3.

" See NSF Cooperative Agreement (Jan. 1, 1993) <httpJ/rs.internic.net/nsf/agreement/>.
85
"InterNIC" stands for Internet Network Information Center. The consortium includes
the National Science Foundation, General Atomics, AT&T, and Network Solutions, Inc. See
generally DANIEL P. DERN, THE INTERNET GUIDE FOR NEW USERS 412-16 (1994) (describing

the history and organization of the InterNIC).
See Jon Swartz, Domains Plan May Result in Net Chaos, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 31, 1998,
at D1.
"7NSI's contract with the NSF expired in March 1998; however, the agreement will be
extended through September. See Rajiv Chandrasekaran, A PressingMatter of Addressing:
Wholl Decide Domains?, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 1997, at D1. The Department of Commerce has
proposed the creation of a private, not-for-profit corporation that will "set policy for and
direct the allocation of number blocks to regional number registries for the assignment of

Internet addresses." Improvement of Technical Management of Internet Names and
Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 8826, 8827 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. ch. XXIII) (proposed Feb. 20,
1998). These regional registries will compete with each other for domain name registrations.
See id. at 8828-29. The corporation will also oversee the operation of an authoritative root
server system and the policy for determining the circumstances under which new top-level
domains will be added to the root system. See id. It will also "coordinate the development
of other technical protocol parameters as needed to maintain universal connectivity on the
Internet." Id. at 8827. The U.S. government would gradually transfer existing domain
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tained a policy of strict neutrality, awarding each particular
address to the first applicant to make a request and allowing the
individual parties to sort out their disputes on their own. Domain

name registration was free until 1995, when NSI began to charge
registrants $100 for registration (which covers two years), as well
a $50 annual maintenance fee.88 The fee was an attempt to
recoup expenses and to limit the practice of cyber-squatting-in
which speculators would stake out names of well-known companies
and products with the intent of selling the names back to the
companies themselves.89 Often the domain names taken by the
cyber-squatters were identical to registered trademarks. This
practice spawned a host of legal disputes, including many in which
NSI itself was named as a defendant. °
In an effort to shield itself from liability, in September 1996, NSI
adopted a new domain name dispute policy that redefined its role
and sought to limit any legal obligations arising from the registration process. 9 Under the new policy, NSI maintains that it does

not determine the legality of domain name registration or otherwise
evaluate whether a registration infringes on the rights of a third
party, nor will it act as an arbiter of disputes.9 2 Rather, upon
proof that a domain name is identical to a valid and subsisting

registration functions to this new corporation. See id. The corporation is expected to be
"established and stable" no later than September 30, 2000. Id. at 8828.
" See Daniel R. Pote, Note, A Domain By Any Other Name: The Federal Trademark
Dilution Act of 1995 Applied to Internet Domain Names, 37 JURIMETRICS J. 301, 305 n.34
(1997).
s9 See Hiawatha Bray, Brainiac v. Brainiac,BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 21, 1998, at Fl; see also,
e.g., Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (awarding
"intermatic.com," which had been registered by a cyber-squatter, back to Intermatic Inc., the
trademark owner).
' See, e.g., Academy of Motion Picture Arts & Sciences v. Network Solutions, Inc., No.
CV 97-6394-LEWMLX, 1997 WL 810472 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 1997); Lockheed Martin Corp.
v. Network Solutions, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 949, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 17,
1997); Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296,40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1908, (C.D.
Cal. 1996); Giacalone v. Network Solutions, Inc., No. C-96 20434 RDA/PVT, 1996 WL 887734
(N.D. Cal. June 14, 1996); cf Network Solutions, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 946 F. Supp.
858 (D. Colo. 1996) (statutory interpleader action brought by NSI).
" See Network Solutions, Inc., Domain Name Dispute Policy (adopted Sept. 9, 1996)
<httpJ/rs.internic.net/domain-info/internic-domain-6.html>; see also Herbert J.Hammond &
Lisa H. Meyerhoff, Cutting Edge Issues in Intellectual Property Law, 1997 COMP. L. REV. &
TECH. J. 43, 86 (discussing the new policy).
9 See Network Solutions, Inc., supra note 91, 1 1, 3.
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foreign or United States registered trademark owned by another
entity, NSI will place the domain name on "hold," meaning it will
not be available for use by any party. 93 In the event of litigation,
NSI will deposit control of the domain name into the court registry
and will agree to abide by any court orders.94
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the new domain dispute
policy is the indemnity agreement that each registrant must accept.
Per the contract, the registrant agrees to "defend, indemnify and
hold harmless" NSI, NSF, and a host of other Internet organizations for any loss or damages resulting from claims arising from
the registration or use of a domain name.9 5 The registration
agreement also includes a limited liability clause, confining NSI's
maximum exposure to $500."
If nothing else, the new policy signifies NSI's refusal to become
involved as an arbiter in these increasingly hostile disputes. 7
While heavily criticized by both existing domain name owners and
exasperated trademark victims alike," the policy of neutrality
demonstrates the practical difficulties and legal costs involved in
finding a fair and efficient solution. Since only one party can own
each individual domain name, these conflicts are inevitable. This
is particularly true in instances where multiple parties own trademark rights to the same name, but only have the rights to use the
trademark in certain distinct product markets. For example,
among United Airlines, United Van Lines, the United Mineworkers

id. it9-19.
"See id. 9120-23.
9See

95Id.

6.

See id. I 11.
See, e.g., Geoffery Green, New York Post in Fight over Domain Name, CYBERTIMES (July
17, 1996) (visited Mar. 20, 1998) <http'//www.nytimes.comlibrary/cyber/week/0717post.html>
(chronicling a dispute between the New York Post and one of its former freelance
contributors); Clive Thompson, Turning College Names into a Business, CYBERTIMES (Nov.
3, 1996) (visited Mar. 20,1998) <http//www.nytimes.comlibrary/cyberweek/l 103name.html>
(describing disputes over domain names similar to official university domain addresses);
McDonald's Gives $3,500 to Get Name Back on Net, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Feb. 6, 1995, at El
(reporting an end to a conflict over "mcdonalds.com"); Video Jockey Butts Heads with MTV
over Internet, PLAIN DEALER (CLEVELAND), May 25, 1994, at 6C (describing the suit by MTV
against former-VJ Adam Curry over "mtv.com").
"See Dueker, supra note 6, at 505 (quoting critics of the policy).
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Union, and the United Way, only one can own "united.com".9
Personal names present yet another predicament, as multiple
claimants to individual surnames are inevitable. °° Of course,
prospective Web site hosts could always choose alternative domain
names.' 1 Still, the value in having the most simple, easy-toremember (if not easy-to-guess) domain address has an obvious
value, one that has already provoked numerous lawsuits between
companies with similar namesl °2 and from companies who have
registered a competitor's names in order
to prevent the competitor
from establishing a Web presence."°3

' The United example is discussed in IntermaticInc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1233
(N.D. Ill. 1996).
"oThese problems are particularly relevant with respect to candidates for public office,
who typically use their surnames as part of their domain names. It is very likely that
multiple candidates with the same surname will appear on the ballot somewhere in the same
election year-if not in the same race, as in Texas's tenth congressional district, in which
both candidates in 1996 were named Doggett. In such a case, who gets the preferred domain
address? Here the "first come, first served" rule may be appropriate, since it establishes a
clear property right to the address, allowing the parties to bargain for the address if one
values it more than the other. Two obvious difficulties remain, however. First, the
likelihood that political adversaries will bargain in good faith is rather low. Second, the
value of a domain name increases dramatically once it is used; therefore, once visitors to the
home page become familiar with the address, it will be costly to change domain names.
Thus, there are no easy answers.
101For example, the mammoth corporation Fidelity Investments was forced to use "fidinv.com" after Fidelity National, a small financial services company in San Jose, California,
registered "fidelity.com" See Dueker, supra note 6, at 494 n.57.
102 See, e.g., Juno Online Servs., L.P. v. Juno Lighting, Inc., 979 F. Supp. 684, 44
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1913 (N.D. II. 1997) (dispute over the registration of"juno.com"); Desknet
Sys., Inc. v. Desknet, Inc., No. 96 CIV. 9548(JSM), 1997 WL 253246 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 1997)
(dispute over registration of "desknet.com"); Trustees of Columbia Univ. v. Columbia/HCA
Healthcare Corp., 964 F. Supp. 733, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (dispute over
"columbia.net"); Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620 (PKL) (ATP) 1997 WL 97097
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997) (dispute over "esqwire.com"); Zippo Mfg. v. Zippo Dot Coin, Inc., 952
F. Supp. 1119, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1062 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (dispute over "zippo.com,"
"zippo.net," and "zippo-news.com"); Network Solutions, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 946 F.
Supp. 858, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1062 (D. Colo. 1996) (dispute over "clue.com"); ActMedia,
Inc. v. Active Media Intl, Inc., No. 96C3448, 1996 WL 466527 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 17, 1996)
(dispute over "actmedia.com"); Comp Examiner Agency, Inc. v. Juris, Inc., No. 96-0213WMB(CTx), WL 376600 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 1996) (dispute over "juris.com"); Inset Sys., Inc.
v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996) (dispute over "inset.com").
02
" See Dueker, supra note 6, at 501 (chronicling the dispute that arose between Princeton
Review and Stanley Kaplan Co. after Princeton registered "kaplan.com" as a "prank").
Similarly, an anti-abortion radio show host registered "plannedparenthood.com" for a site
used to promote sales of a pro-life book. A federal district court in New York awarded the
domain name to Planned Parenthood after the organization sued claiming trademark
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From a candidate's perspective, the use of a confusing domain

name can be the difference between a humorous but harmless
attempt to poke fun and an act of political sabotage. By appropriating an official-sounding domain name, the parodist can draw
Internet traffic away from the real candidate's home page."
This in turn will diminish the size of the candidate's audience,

thereby hindering his ability to recruit supporters, communicate
with the press, and disseminate his message to the undecided
voters. Furthermore, by diverting potential visitors, a parody site
can also impede Internet fund-raising. 5
The problem becomes especially damaging when Net users fail to
recognize that the parody is not really the official campaign site.

For example, when software test developers Brooks Talley and
Mark Pace established Web sites at "dole96.org," "clinton96.org,"
"forbes96.org," and "buchanan96.org," 10 6 about twenty percent of
the e-mail inquiries they received were "sincere campaign questions
or comments" 10 7 asking for bumper stickers and offering to volunteer.'0 8 America Online also thought the sites were the real
thing: In October 1995, AOL directed users to the "dole96.org"
parody for information about the congressional debate over the
various balanced budget proposals. Over two thousand messages
streamed into the parodists' mailboxes, and Talley and Pace had to

politely explain that they were not accepting campaign contribuinfringement. See Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1430 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); see also Oram, supra note 6 (discussing the case). In Bucci, the
adversaries were not competitors in the economic sense, but rather were vying for attention
in the marketplace of ideas.
" In the political arena, a conflict has recently arisen between Sen. Alphonse D'Amato
(R-NY) and Geraldine Ferraro, candidates for U.S. Senate from New York. A Republican
political consultant in Tennessee registered "ferraro.com" for a site that urges visitors to
"Vote D'Amato!" before sending them to the official D'Amato campaign site. See Jon R.
Sorensen, Site Snares FerraroFans in D'Amato Web, N.Y. DAILY NEwS, Feb. 3, 1998, at 10.
Political fundraising over the Internet has already proven to be "more successful than
"o'
anticipated." Powell, supranote 3 (quoting Adam Sohn, one of the organizers of the ClintonGore Web site); see also Kevin Maney, Cyber.Campaigning,USA TODAY, Apr. 15, 1996 at Al
(discussing the future of online campaign fundraising).
100Talley and Pace also established sites at "wilson96.org," "powel196.org,"
"limbaugh96.org," "quayle96.org," and "gates96.org."
" Lisa Leiter, Parody in the Home Pages Scrambles 'theReal Thing', WASH. TIMES, Mar.
25, 1996, at 16.
0
" See Mike Christensen, Surfing Cyberspace: From Candidatesto Critics,Internet Goes
Political,ATLANTA J. & CONST., Aug. 30, 1995, at 1IA.
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tions for the Dole campaign. °9 After Bob Dole made a slight
mistake in announcing his Web site's address during the first
presidential debate, thousands of visitors mistakenly ended up at
the parody instead. 10 Even the New York Times on one occasion
mislabeled the pranksters' parody Buchanan site as his campaign's
official home page. 11
Thus, in its current state, the Internet is not yet ready to assume
its responsibilities as the solution to the uninformed voter dilemma.
Voters need assurances that the information they retrieve is
accurate, 2 or else they will not invest in its procurement. Yet
on today's Internet, as George Pateman of InterNIC Registration
Services stated, "[if you mis-hit a couple keys, you could wind up
somewhere completely unintended and not know it."" 3 Although
seemingly harmless, the ease with which unauthorized sites could
become a haven for dirty tricks, misinformation, and voter confusion demonstrates their potential for misuse, whether intentional
or not. As Howard University Professor Ron Beasley remarked,
"[aill it would take is for someone, just before the election, to start
posting items attributing remarks to candidates that the candidates
did not make."'
If users cannot recognize the fake for what it
is, "[iut could alienate just enough voters to make a difference."" 5

' 09 See id.
"o

See Aaron Zitner, Dole's On Line, But So Are Pranksters,BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 8, 1996,

at A13.
.. See Corrections, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 24, 1995, at A2.
"2 Cf Kelly Kunsch, Diogenes Wanders the Superhighway:A Proposalfor Authentication
of Publicly Disseminated Documents on the Internet, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 749 (1997)

(discussing the problems associated with using the Internet for research due to the fact that
the Internet has no overseeing entity that checks documents for truth and accuracy).
"' Scott Bowles, Travelers on Internet Can Look for White House and End Up in Fun
House, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 1996, at BI (describing the effort of two 22-year-olds to create
a parody of the White House Web site, 'www.whitehouse.gov," utilizing the domain name
"www.whitehouse.net).
"' Nathaniel Sheppard, Jr., New Technology Offers Avenue for Old-Time PoliticalPranks,
Cm. TRIB., Nov. 1, 1995, at 23.
.' Id. Though the prospect that Internet campaign fraud could somehow affect the
outcome of a presidential election seems unlikely, one can easily recognize the potential for
such activities to influence local elections, including congressional races, which are often
decided by less than one thousand votes. As the number of Internet users increases, the
potential for online misinformation to affect electoral outcomes grows substantially.
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III. How PROTECTED IS POLITICAL PARODY?
One can imagine that office-seekers would not be very happy to
have such "spurious, derogatory or misleading" information
attached to their candidacy, whether intended as a joke or an
attack."' Undoubtedly, during the 1996 presidential campaign,
many campaign staffers pondered legal attempts to enjoin the
offensive material." 7 Other campaigns may have curtailed their
own involvement in online campaigning as a result of the appearance of the parodies, concluding the Internet is nothing but "a vast
wasteland of unregulated ...communication.""'

Online parod-

ists may indeed be able to take refuge in the First Amendment,
particularly when their sites are recognized as "political speech."
However, in the past, courts have enjoined parodies on a number
of different grounds, especially in cases where the person or
organization spoofed suffered measurable damages." 9
Similarly, governments have been permitted to regulate even
parody and satire when the expression is responsible for substantial harm. In fact, previous parody cases have defined the limits of
For
free expression over new communications technologies.
example, the Supreme Court's decision in FCC v. PacificaFoundation 2 ° allowed a federal regulatory agency to punish a radio
station for airing George Carlin's satirical monologue that mocked
the seven dirty words that were forbidden to be uttered over the
Maintaining that content found to be " 'vulgar,'
airwaves.''
'offensive' and 'shocking' .

. .

. is not entitled to absolute constitu-

tional protection under all circumstances," 2 the Court disallowed
Id.
There is significant evidence that this did indeed occur. White House spokeswoman
Mary Ellen Glynn said that the White House was "going to see if there's anything that can
be done to make sure our page isn't confused with [www.whitehouse.netl." See Bowles, supra
note 113. The Pete Wilson campaign threatened to sue Brooks and Talley under libel and
election laws. See Letter from Brooks Talley to the author (via e-mail) (Mar. 12, 1997) (on
file with the author). However, Wilson was out of the race three days later; thus, the suit
never materialized.
118 James Gleick, dirtytricks@campaign96.org,N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 3, 1995, at 20
(quoting Dole campaign press secretary Nelson Warfield).
11

119

See infra Sections III.A-E.

438 U.S. 726 (1978).
See id.
121
'2 Id. at 747.
'0
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the station's defense that the broadcast was "merely using words
to satirize as harmless and essentially silly [Americans'] attitudes
towards those words." 12
Over the past four years, state and federal courts have tangled
with the question of how to apply traditional legal rules to Internet
cases. Since no court has yet addressed the issue of parody in
cyberspace,'12 these controversies present an interesting opportunity to determine whether the legal doctrines judges have begun to
establish in other Internet contexts are appropriately extended to
proscribe unauthorized trademark uses. Like Pacifica, which
defined the limits of broadcast speech-the last revolution in
communications technology-such cases will likely force the courts
to draw similar boundaries for First Amendment protections in the
digital age.
A. PARODY AND TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT

Trademark law represents the most fertile ground for parties
seeking to enjoin unauthorized domain name use, and thus would
probably be the first legal claim made in any attempt to suppress
these political parodies. A trademark is any word, name, symbol
or device, or any combination thereof, used by a party to identify
and distinguish its products or services from those offered by
others. 25 Unlike copyright law, which permits a broad fair use
exception, 2 6 trademark law forbids the unauthorized use of
id. at 730.
" The issue of parody on the Internet has arisen in two cases; however, the courts have
yet to engage in any substantive analysis of the issue. In Planned ParenthoodFederation
ofAmerica, Inc. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1430, 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), the court rejected
the defendant's argument that his Web site was intended to be a parody because the site did
not "convey the simultaneous message that the home page and Web site are those of the
plaintiff and those of the defendant." And in Dow Jones & Co. v. Parisi,133 F.3d 906 (2d
Cir. 1998), the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's granting of Dow Jones's motion
for voluntary dismissal before the parties had the opportunity to submit briefs on the issue
of whether Parisi's use of "wsj.com" was entitled to protection as a parody.
'2

"2

See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (1994); MICHAEL D. SCOTT, SCOTT ON MULTIMEDIA LAW

§ 5.011A), at 5-3 (2d ed. 1997).
" The fair use exception excuses copyright infringement where a derivative work is a
new composition that uses the protected work to comment on the original. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 107; Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994); see also Pierre N. Leval,
Towards a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1105 (1990) (discussing fair use as a

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol5/iss2/6

26

Oram: Will the Real Candidate Please Stand Up?: Political Parody On the

19981

POLITICAL PARODY

493

another party's mark wherever the use is "likely to cause confusion,
or to cause a mistake, or to deceive."1 27 Regardless of their
humor or redeeming social value, parodies that utilize registered
trademarks have often been enjoined, including efforts that could
be characterized as political speech. 2
Before considering the case law in this area, it is important to
define the role of trademark law. A trademark is a distinctive
attribute attached to goods or connected to services that identifies
their source. 129 By simplifying the process by which consumers
acquire product information, trademarks lower the "search costs"
consumers face in differentiating between various goods. 30 In
addition, trademarks are valuable symbols of the goodwill that
companies establish through continued investment in quality
products or services. Thus, sellers can capture some of the benefits
of trademarks by charging higher prices. 3 ' The law therefore
serves dual purposes: It provides producers a means by which to
establish a reputational relationship with their customers, and
offers consumers assurance that the goods they purchase are in fact
of the quality they have come to expect from particular sellers. 3 2
The unauthorized use of a registered mark threatens to cause
confusion in the marketplace, thus raising consumers' "search
costs" and destroying the reputational benefits of trademarks.
The federal Lanham Act 133 places significant limits on the
ownership of trademark rights. Most importantly, trademark
rights do not accrue until the mark itself is used in commerce. 34

rational and integral aspect of copyright law).
'27See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)a); § 1114(1)(b) (identical text); see also § 1125(aXl)(A) (using
identical language to define rights under the federal unfair competition statute).
'2

See infra notes 181, 294-297, 356 (citing numerous examples).

" The Lanham Act establishes a separate category of marks called "service marks." For
the purposes of this Article, however, these two terms can be treated interchangeably, since
under the Act both service marks and trademarks are treated similarly for registration
purposes. See 15 U.S.C. § 1053.
'3 George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213, 219 (1961).
1 See Peter E. Mims, Note, Promotional Goods and the Functionality Doctrine: An
Economic Model of Trademarks, 63 TEx. L. REV. 639, 658 n. 102 (1984).
132 For an excellent discussion of trademark law, see J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION (4th ed. 1998).

"3 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127.
'3 See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a). However, the registrant can earn priority for trademark
ownership rights by filing an affidavit of a bona fide intent to use the mark in commerce.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b).
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The Act defines commerce broadly as "all commerce which may be
lawfully regulated by Congress."3 5 As such, a political campaign
can register its candidate's name as a trademark since campaigns
involve a myriad of commercial activities that Congress has the
power to regulate, including fundraising, political campaign
services, and the distribution or sale of campaign propaganda. 3 '
In 1996, some presidential candidates did register trademarks for
these purposes. 37 Federal trademark registration provides prima
facie evidence of a mark's validity and the registrant's exclusive
right to use the mark in connection with the goods or services
specified in the registratipn application.13 However, a campaign
that did not register a trademark might still have a federal remedy
for unfair competition under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act,"'9

"3
15 U.S.C. § 1127; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (The Commerce Clause)
("Congress shall have the Power... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.... ."). Until recently, the Commerce Clause
has been construed very broadly, giving Congress the power to regulate many areas not
generally considered to involve "interstate commerce," so long as there was a rational basis
for a finding that the regulated activities "substantially affected" commerce. See, e.g., Hodel
v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981). However, the
Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the principle that the Commerce Clause represents a
limitation on federal power. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
The Lanham Act does contain a provision which excludes marks that "consist of a
surname" from the Federal Register. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e). However, although surnames
themselves cannot be protected, a name can be registered as a trademark if it has achieved
secondary meaning in the marketplace-that is, the mark must have become uniquely
associated with a specific source. See In re Harris-Intertype Corp., 518 F.2d 629, 186
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 238 (C.C.P.A. 1975); In re Kahan & Weisz Jewelry Mfg. Corp., 508 F.2d 831,
184 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 421 (C.C.P.A. 1975). Such a showing will overcome the prohibition
under Section 1052(e). In addition, there is no ban against using a surname as part of a
mark; the prohibition only applies to marks which consist solely of a single surname. See
Sco'r, supra note 125, § 5.09, at 5-16; see also In re Hutchinson Tech., Inc., 852 F.2d 552,
7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1490 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that the entire mark, not merely the
surname, must be considered in determining whether the mark has achieved secondary
meaning).
' The Dole campaign registered "Dole for President" along with a distinctive design as
the trademark for the campaign. See Trademark Serial No. 74-679,072, available in
WESTLAW's FIP-TM database. In addition, friends of eventual Republican vice-presidential
nominee Jack Kemp registered "ream Kemp" as both a trademark and a service mark.
Their trademark application sought use of the mark on products such as paper goods,
housewares and glass, receptacles, prints and publications, and clothing. See Trademark
Serial Nos. 74-430,419 & 74-430,234.
15815 U.S.C. § 1115.
'39 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); infra Section III.B.
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or for trademark dilution under Section 43(c).140 Hence, even if
a campaign does not register its mark, it can still protect itself from
the unauthorized use-of "any word, term, name, symbol, or device,
or any combination thereof' used to designate
the source, sponsor4
1
service.1
or
product
any
of
approval
or
ship,
Thus, petitioning for legal protection under the trademark laws
appears to be a simple solution. If political campaigns can protect
their symbols and slogans by registering them with the Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO), this ought to solve the problem. And for
many violations, it does. For example, if the Political Americana
store in Washington, D.C. sells T-shirts embroidered with the
campaign's "Dole for President" mark, it must first obtain permission from the campaign. Without permission, the store would
essentially be "passing off" the T-shirts as official Dole campaign
merchandise. 42 This "passing off' would constitute an unauthorized use in commerce,
and therefore a trademark infringement
143
under the statute.

The typical parody, however, does not involve a commercial use,
at least not as the phrase has been interpreted by the courts.
While the Lanham Act does 'not contain a fair use exemption, 4
courts have often interpreted the "in commerce" requirement to
serve a similar function. Indeed, courts have continuously ruled
that "parody and satire are deserving of substantial freedom-both
as entertainment and as a form of social and literary criticism." 45
As a result of this judicial leniency, satirists have targeted
trademarks, providing social commentary on many famous marks
that have become an "integral part of the national culture. "146
Despite this judicial tendency, there is no per se parody exception
under trademark law. Rather, a so-called "parody defense" will
entail one of two arguments. First, a parody defense might involve
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c); infra Section III.c.
..15 U.S.C. § 1125(aX1).
142Cf Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 778-79 & n.5, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1081, 1086-87 & n.13 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring) (discussing the history of the
common law tort of passing off).
'4
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a).
144 See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
'"Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 545, 14 U.S.P.Q. 1, 4 (2d Cir. 1964).
'"Harriette K Dorsen, Satiric Appropriation and the Law of Libel, Trademark, and
Copyright: Remedies Without Wrongs, 65 B.U. L. REV. 923, 939 (1985).
'40
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a provocative phrasing of the traditional response that customers
are not likely to be confused about a particular product's source or
sponsorship on account of the unique nature of the unauthorized
use. 147 Under the statute, where there is no likelihood of confusion as to source or sponsorship, there can be no infringement. 14 8
Simply put:49 "A non-infringing parody is merely amusing, not
confusing."1

However, an inherent tension exists between the nature of
parody and the "likelihood of confusion" test. As the Second Circuit
has stated, "A parody must convey two simultaneous-and
contradictory-messages: that it is the original,but also that it is
not the original and is instead a parody." 5 ° Therefore, every
parody must be at least "confusing" enough to grab the viewer's
attention and spur her to recall the original; yet at some point the
viewer must recognize the parody for what it is, otherwise it has
not conveyed its communicative message.
The second "parody defense" argument is derived from the "in
commerce" requirement. This provision ensures that when the
unauthorized use of a mark is part of a communicative message,
and therefore does not function as a source identifier, the First
Amendment trumps the trademark owner's property rights.'5 '
Many uses have been held to constitute "expressions of noncommercial speech,"'52 despite the fact that the user's expression
is employed to sell a book,153 movie, 5 4 magazine,'55 or nation-

1,7 See Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d
1394, 1405,42 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1184, 1193 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 27 (1997).
'" See James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 274, 192
U.S.P.Q. 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1976) ("Illnfringement is found when the evidence indicates a

likelihood of confusion, deception or mistake on the part of the consuming public.
Infringement does not exist, though the marks be identical and the goods very similar, when
the evidence indicates no such likelihood.").
"4 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 132, § 31:153, at 31-223.
190 Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g Group, 886 F.2d 490, 494, 12
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289, 1291 (2d Cir. 1989) (emphasis added).
1
" ' See Yankee Publ'g Inc. v. News Am. Publg Inc., 809 F. Supp. 267, 276, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1752, 1758 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (Leval, J.).
152 Id. at 276 n.10.
13 See Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 490.
19 See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 996, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1825, 1826 (2d Cir.
1989).
1"

See Yankee Publ'g Inc., 809 F. Supp. at 267.
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al defense initiative.5 6 However, property rights in trademarks
are not extinguished "simply because the alleged infringing use is
in connection with a work of artistic expression."'57 In interpreting the "in commerce" requirement, courts have held that the right
to prohibit unauthorized uses of a mark extends only to injurious,
commercial uses. 5 This idea is consistent with the suggestion
in the Restatement of Unfair Competition that, in the context of
expressive uses, courts apply a balancing test. Under such a test,
substantial evidence of confusion is required to outweigh the strong
public interest in free expression."5 9 As a result, there is a not-sofine line between protected expression and illegal infringement.
Within the context of the Internet, however, the federal courts
have held that the reach of the "in commerce" requirement
unquestionably encompasses domain name controversies. Because
"Internet users constitute a national, even international, audience,
who must use interstate telephone lines to access [Web sites]," the
commercial requirement may be automatically satisfied by any
Such a rule essentially allows
Internet activity whatsoever. 6
courts to avoid the messy jurisdictional requirement in cases
involving trademarks in cyberspace. The risk, however, is that

..See Lucasfilm Ltd. v. High Frontier, 622 F. Supp. 931, 933-35, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
967, 968-69 (D.D.C. 1985) (refusing to enjoin defendant's use of the term "Star Wars" in
presenting its views about the Reagan Administration's Strategic Defense Initiative
program).
157Silverman v. CBS, 870 F.2d 40, 49, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1778, 1785 (2d Cir. 1989).
55

'

See id.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 20 cmt. b (1995) (Reporter's
,69
note). Cases employing this balancing test include Cliffs Notes, Inc. u. Bantam Doubleday
Dell Publg Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 495 (2d Cir. 1989); Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999; and
Yankee Publ'g, 809 F. Supp. at 277-78.
1" Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1430, 1434
(S.D.N.Y. 1997). Thus, the mere registration of a federally registered trademark as a domain
name can be actionable; there need not be any actual use in cyberspace. The instant a
registered mark is registered as a domain name with NSI, federal Lanham Act jurisdiction
is triggered. This allows for swift legal action against cyber-squatters and domain-hijackers,
including those who have yet to use the mark to identify a particular site or server. See
Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1239 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (holding that use of
plaintiffs trademark in domain name on Internet satisfies the "in commerce" requirement);
see also 1 JEROME GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 5.11(2), at 5-234 (1996)

("Because Internet communications transmit instantaneously on a worldwide basis there is
little question that the 'in commerce' requirement would be met in a typical Internet
message, be it trademark infringement or false advertising.").
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allowing an Internet presence alone to trigger "use in commerce"
will bring a myriad of non-commercial uses into the purview of the
Lanham Act, such as news reporting, criticism, and parody, that
would be outside the reach of the Act were the uses confined to
traditional media.
Other courts have held that interfering with the commerce of
another party will fulfill the statutory test. In PlannedParenthood
Federation of America, Inc. V. Bucci,"' the court ruled that the
defendant's use of "plannedparenthood.com" prevented users from
reaching plaintiff Planned Parenthood's official site ("ppfa.org")
because "[prospective users of plaintiffs services who mistakenly
access defendant's Web site may fail to continue to search for
plaintiffs own home page, due to anger, frustration, or the belief
that plaintiffs home page does not exist.""6 2 Therefore, the court
stated that the act of establishing a Web site was sufficient to
trigger the "in commerce" requirement because of the effect the
defendant's behavior had on the plaintiffs interstate commercial
activities." 3 This notion, which I will refer to as the "doctrine of
commercial interference," also provides courts with a bright-line
rule-an easy way to justify decisions against the cyber-squattors
and domain-name hijackers.
Despite the significant value the First Amendment affords to
parody and political expression, the case law suggests that in a
hypothetical Dole v. Talley claim of trademark infringement the
former Senator would be likely to prevail. First, under both the
"doctrine of commercial interference" and the theory that the
nature of the Internet as an interstate communications medium
brings any online trademark use under the jurisdiction of the
federal courts,'
the site would probably be found to be "in
commerce." Second, Talley and Pace included the Dole campaign's
federally registered trademark in the title of their Web site,'6 5

18

42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1430 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).

Id. at 1435.
16 See id. at 1437.

"2

See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
On most World Wide Web browsers, a Web site's "title" appears prominently in large
type at the top of the page. Furthermore, when a search engine includes the page in its
report to the user, the page's title appears in bold print. Thus, the title represents one of the
most distinctive aspects of a Web site.
16
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and clearly employed the phrase in an attempt to briefly create the
impression that the page was actually a product of the Dole
campaign; thus, the use was clearly meant to convey a false
designation of source, as required under the statute.' 66
Finally, because most netizens have not yet become fully
Internet-proficient, the likelihood of confusion online is potentially
greater than it would be for similar uses in traditional media.
Given the infancy of the medium and the learning curve individuals
must brave to master its intricacies, many aspects of the Internet
continue to provoke significant consumer confusion. This heightened degree of confusion has provided the basis for many courts to
enjoin the unauthorized use of a trademark as a domain name. 67
In Bucci, for example, the district court held that the degree of
similarity between "plannedparenthood.com" and the words
"Planned Parenthood" made the two marks "nearly identical." 6s
In addition, the judge found that, because ".com" is a popular
designation for domain names, many users are likely to simply
assume that appending ".com" to the end of a company's name will
bring them to its home page. 69 Of course, this is a naive view:
Though a user may get lucky on occasion, guessing domain names
is hardly a fail safe method. 7 °
In addition, because of the "temporary delay" that occurs while
a Web page "loads" into the computer, users cannot immediately
determine the content of a site upon entering its address into their
browsers."" Depending on the speed at which one accesses the
Internet, the user encounters a delay of a few seconds between the
time when she types the domain name into her browser and the
moment the page appears. Additional delays occur each time the
user clicks on a link to retrieve additional information. According
to Bucci, these "lengthy" delays between the user's intent to access
information and her recognition of the spoof also raise the likeli-

See supra note 127 and accompanying text.

16 See, e.g., Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1430.
16

at 1435.
See id.

'7

Cf Oram, supra note 6, at 873 & n.31 (arguing that the Bucci court should have

168Id.

equated domain-guessing with user carelessness).
'7 Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1438.
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hood of confusion.' 72 This reasoning is more evidence of the
judiciary's heightened scrutiny over cyberspace activity, which can
be understood as an attempt to crack down on the ubiquitous
intellectual property infringement that plagues the Internet.
Compare this reasoning with the First Circuit's 1996 decision in
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Winship Green Nursing
Center.7 3 In that case, the court found that there was no likelihood of confusion where management had disseminated a letter
displaying the union's service mark, written on union letterhead,
and bearing the signature of a union plenipotentiary. 174 The
letter suggested that the union (LAM) supported the termination of
the recipient's employment, but was meant to be anti-union
propaganda. A second correspondence contained a simulated
invoice, again inscribed on LAM letterhead (and again bearing its
service mark), this time implying that union dues would skyrocket
were workers to choose IAM as their collective bargaining representative. 175 Despite the clever fake, however, the court ruled that
the "historic enmity between labor and management" should have
conditioned voters to "view with suspicion any claims made by
either party about the other." 7 " Thus, there could be no likelihood of confusion because the voters were expected to be vigilant
enough to recognize the hoax.
A comparison between these two cases suggests that the most
important distinguishing factor is the difference in communications
1 77
media employed. Surely any person of ordinary intelligence
17 Id.
7

103 F.3d 196, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1251 (1st Cir. 1996).

M7'
See id. at 201.

See id. at 199.
at 207.
171 In determining whether the use of a mark promotes a likelihood of confusion, the
courts generally adopt the test of whether an individual of "ordinary intelligence" would be
likely to be confused by the unauthorized use. See Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Indus.,
30 F.3d 466, 475, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1592, 1600 (3d Cir. 1994) (concluding that
"'purchasers of ordinary intelligence' were unlikely to [be] confuse[d]"); see also Indianapolis
Colts, Inc. v. Metropolitan Baltimore Football Club Ltd., 34 F.3d 410, 414, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1811, 1815 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner, J.) (explaining that trademark law is not meant
"to protect the most gullible fringe of the consuming public"); United States v. 88 Cases,
More or Less, Containing Bireley's Orange Beverage, 187 F.2d 967,971 (3d Cir. 1951) (noting
that Congress "contemplated the reaction of the ordinary person who is neither savant nor
dolt, [and] who ... exercises a normal measure of the layman's common sense and
judgment").
17

176Id.
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would be just as likely to recognize the conflict in Bucci between
pro- and anti-abortion advocates, and would therefore be suspicious
of either party's claims. Despite the fact that Internet users are,
as a whole, more affluent and better educated than the general
public, the Bucci court doubted their sophistication as consumers
of political propaganda.
Bucci suggests that until users become familiar and comfortable
with surfing the Internet, courts will continue to treat Net users as
unwitting victims, while holding users of conventional media to a
significantly higher standard of sophistication.17 This judicial
paternalism may help deter cyber-squatters and domain-hijackers,
but it comes at a significant cost. For while it may be meant to
serve legitimate government purposes, it also makes it incredibly
easy for parody victims to enjoin the speech of their assailants,
regardless of the value or political or social importance of parody's
message.' 79 Courts have tended to find any unauthorized use to
be a per se violation of the Lanham Act. Thus, through doctrines
already developed by the courts, parodies that employ officialsounding domain names must automatically be treated as suspect
with respect to trademark infringement.
Few would argue against the proposition that domain names
have taken on a source-denoting role.180 Because judges have
decided thatmerely having an Internet presence constitutes a "use
in commerce," and have implicitly assumed that Web surfers are
less sophisticated than consumers who rely on traditional communications media, little breathing room remains for Web expression
that utilizes registered marks. Given these precedents, a candidate

179

The judiciary is not alone in its assumption that Americans are the unwitting victims

of new technologies. Witness U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Commissioner Bruce
Lehman's justification for why he thinks current intellectual property law will last well into
the next century: "Most Americans still can't figure out how to program their VCRs.. . .They
are not going to be able to get onto the World Wide Web and locate, on some obscure bulletin
board, the latest copies of Microsoft's computer programs." Michael Noer, Policing
Cyberspace, FORBES, Apr. 10, 1995, at 50, 51.
Political speech, though highly venerated in our society, is not immune from
1
government regulation-particularly time, place, and manner restrictions. See infra Section
111. (noting that some restrictions on political speech are justified).
8
"o But cf Oram, supra note 6, at 872 (maintaining that the appropriate question to ask
is not whether domain names currently serve a source-denoting function, but whether they
should play such a role).
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would probably have an excellent case against pranksters like
Talley and Pace, despite the fact that their efforts were meant to
spoof and not to deceive. Conceivably, a court might enjoin only
the use of the infringing domain addresses, thereby leaving open
other avenues of expression for similar efforts. 81 For example,
the defendants might be allowed to choose a different, lessconfusing domain name, such as "dole-parody.org." Without an
official-sounding domain, however, the parodists would be unable
to simultaneously create the appearance that their composition
both is and is not the original. In essence, then, these legal rules
can be used to thwart effective trademark parodies, since without
an official-sounding domain, a parody would be left effectively
impotent.
B.

PARODY AND UNFAIR COMPETITION

Its roots in the common law tort of deceit, the law of unfair
competition is also aimed at "protecting consumers from confusion
as to source." 82 As amended in 1988, the federal unfair competition statute, Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, forbids the use of
marks,"s false designations of origin, or false or misleading
descriptions and representations of fact that are likely to cause
marketplace confusion as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of
commercial activities.'8 4 Since it does not require PTO registration as a prerequisite to federal protection, Section 43(a) provides
a remedy for individuals and corporations whether or not they have
registered their marks. Furthermore, it allows claims for infringement of many aspects of products or services that are not registerable under the Lanham Act, for example, distinctive trade

1"See, e.g., Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 402, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1314, 1316 (8th Cir. 1987); Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1559,
1571 (S.D. Cal. 1996), affd 109 F.3d 1394, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1184 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,

118 S. Ct. 27 (1997).
' Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 157,9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1847, 1854 (1989) (emphasis removed).
1a3 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (1994) (including "any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or
any combination thereof").
184 15 U.S.C. § 1125(aXl)(A).
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dress. 85 The statute could, therefore, conceivably provide a cause
of action for a candidate whose graphics had been copied from his
or her campaign Web page to create a look-alike parody. 8 6
Again, the test for determining liability under Section 43(a) is
likelihood of confusion. 8 7 Courts generally engage in an analysis
similar to that used in trademark infringement cases, typically
considering a number of different factors to weigh the likelihood of

confusion.

For example, such a finding could be supported by

evidence of actual confusion, including the reported statements by
Talley and Pace that many visitors actually thought their parodies
were the real thing. 8 '
There has been significant debate regarding the extent to which
Section 43(a) can be used to suppress certain forms of constitution-

ally protected speech. For example, during the 1989 congressional
debate over amendments to Section 43(a) that were designed to
make product disparagement an actionable wrong, members of
Congress voiced concerns that the proposed changes "should not be
read in any way to limit political speech, consumer or editorial
comment, parodies, satires, or other constitutionally protected
material."" 9 Today, however, plaintiffs often invoke Section 43(a)
in attempts to enjoin activities that defendants maintain are
merely intended as parody or satire. 90 Therefore, these concerns

'
Trade dress is broadly defined as the overall look or appearance of a product or its
packaging. The appearance must be both "distinctive" and "non-functional" to gain federal
protection. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992) (upholding a
restaurant's claim for trade dress infringement under § 43(a)).
" See Sally M. Abel & Marilyn Tiki Dare, Trademark Issues in Cyberspace: The Brave
New Frontier 1 70-71 (Oct. 28, 1996) <httpd/www.fenwick.compub/sma-trade2.html>
(suggesting that Pat Buchanan might have a claim of trade dress infringement against
Talley and Pace because the parodists "slavishly copied" the candidate's site).
187 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(aXl)(A) (forbidding unauthorized uses that are "likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association
of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her
goods, services, or commercial activities by another person").
'88See supra notes 107-109 and accompanying text.
189135 CONG. REC. H1216-17 (1989) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier); see also Seven-Up

Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 86 F.3d 1379, 1383 n.6 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Kastenmeier's concerns
for the
proposition that § 43(aX)()B) applies only to commercial speech).
1
See, e.g., Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997)
(holding Penguin Books liable for its parody of the O.J. Simpson murder trial, written in the
same style and substantially similar to The Cat in the Hat), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 27 (1997);
Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
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over the effect of the 1989 amendments must be viewed as
inconsistent with both the history of unfair competition law and the
nature of our constitutional system of government. First, as the
cases demonstrate, unfair competition law has always recognized
limits to the protection of both parody and political speech where
the result is consumer or voter confusion. 191 Second, regardless
of Congress' intent, courts would never interpret the statute so as
to infringe on constitutionally-protected expression, for a law of
Congress cannot be read to constrain the reach of the First
Amendment.' 92 Thus, these statements represent nothing more
than a reminder that even after the revision of Section 43(a),
parody retains the same degree of First Amendment protection
previously extended by the courts. Where free speech interests are
outweighed by the state's compelling interest in preventing
marketplace confusion, the judiciary retains the obligation to limit
even political parody.
Unlike the federal dilution statute,"'3 Section 43(a) has not
been construed to contain a blanket parody exemption that would
allow humorists to disparage products and confuse consumers. 9 4
In the context of domain names, courts have held that the use of a
confusing domain name can create the appearance that the Web
site has the "origin, sponsorship or approval" of the marks' rightful
owner.'
In practice, courts have applied Section 43(a)'s "likelihood of confusion" test in the same manner as they have the test

1865 (10th Cir. 1996) (refusing to enjoin Cardtoons from producing trading cards that
lampooned professional baseball players); Nike, Inc. v. "Just Did It" Enters., 6 F.3d 1225, 28
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (7th Cir. 1993) (remanding to the district court to determine

likelihood of confusion between "Mike" and "Just Did It"and Nike's "Nike" and "Just Do It"
trademark); White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1583
(9th Cir. 1992) (remanding to determine if Samsung's depiction of Vanna White as a robot,
used to promote its products, resulted in confusion).
'9 See, e.g., Dr. Seuss Enters., 109 F.3d at 1405; Nike, Inc., 6 F.3d at 1228; White, 971

F.2d at 1401 & n.3.
" See, e.g., ACLU v. Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228, 1233-35 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (enjoining
enforcement of a Georgia statute that criminalized certain forms of anonymous speech on the

Internet).
See infra Section III.C.
' See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1430,
1436 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding defendant's actions to be a commercial use within the meaning

of the Federal Dilution Act).
195

15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (1994).
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for trademark infringement. 1
Given the courts' reluctance to
allow any unauthorized use of trademarks on the Internet, there is
little doubt that the Lanham Act would provide a successful cause
of action for a candidate aggrieved by an offending parody,
regardless of whether or not the campaign had registered a
trademark with the PTO.
C. PARODY AND TRADEMARK DILUTION

In January 1996, President Clinton signed into law the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act,197 which protects "famous" trademarks

from unauthorized use even where the use engenders little or no
likelihood of confusion. 8 The Act offers an injunction remedy to
trademark owners where the unauthorized use causes the blurring 199 or tarnishment0 ° of the mark's distinctive quality. In
addition, twenty-eight states have similar statutes that protect
marks against dilution.2 °1 One of the purposes of the federal
statute was, as articulated by Senator Pat Leahy (D-VT), to "help
stem the use of deceptive Internet addresses taken by those who
are choosing marks that are associated with the products and

9

'

See, e.g., Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1436.

Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 3(a), 109 Stat. 985
(1996) (codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 1127).
19 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (Supp. 1996). The statute, however, does establish a list of
eight factors that a court may consider in determining whether a mark is distinctive and
famous. See § 1125(cX1)(A)-(H). These factors are similar to the traditional likelihood of
confusion test; therefore "their application can be expected to draw from existing [trademark
infringement] precedents." David S. Versfelt, Early Developments Under the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act, in FALSE ADVERTISING AND THE LAW: COPING WITH TODAY'S
CHALLENGES 323, 339 (1996) (PLI Corporate Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No.
954, 1996).
19 Blurring entails "a diminution in the uniqueness and individuality of the mark."
Exxon Corp. v. Oxxford Clothes, Inc., 109 F.3d 1070, 1081, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1417, 1426
(5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 299 (1997).
'20
Tarnishment involves "an injury resulting from another's use ofthe mark in a manner
that tarnishes or appropriates the goodwill and reputation associated with the plaintiff's
mark." Id. at 1081.
'OSee Susan L. Serad, One Year After Dilution's Entry into Federal TrademarkLaw, 32
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 215, 218 n.34 (1997). Many of these laws have existed for decades and
some may have provided the model for the federal statute. See, e.g., 765 ILL. COMP. STAT.
1035/15 (West 1993); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 360-1 (McKinney 1998).
'
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reputations of others. " 202 Since its passage, the Act has been
invoked by a number of trademark owners to retrieve trademarked
Internet
domain names from cyber-squatters and domain-hijack2 03
ers.
The new law defines dilution as "the lessening of the capacity of
a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services,
regardless of the presence or absence of (1) competition between the
owner of the famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of
confusion, mistake or deception."2" To qualify under this statute,
marks need not be registered under federal law; however, registration can provide evidence that a mark is indeed "famous" enough
to deserve protection. 5 Although most states do not require that
a mark be famous to earn protection, courts have often interpreted
state dilution statutes to extend protection only to well-known
marks. °6
On its face, the federal anti-dilution law would appear to provide
a strong claim for parody victims seeking to retrieve a particular
domain address. 7 Because the statute requires neither a showing of market competition nor likelihood of confusion, a campaign
could conceivably enjoin a site even where it was clear to all who
visited that the site was merely a joke. The statute, however,
20
contains an exception for what it terms "noncommercial use." 1
The exception was included to appease critics who feared the Act
might be used to limit consumer criticism and genuine news
reporting.

2m

141 CONG. REc. S19,312 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
See, e.g., Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, (N.D. Ill.
1996) (awarding

"intermatic.com" to the plaintiff); Toys "R" Us Inc. v. Akkaoui, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836
(N.D. Cal. 1996) (forbidding the defendant from using "adultsrus.com"); Hasbro Inc. v.
Internet Entertainment Group Ltd., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1479 (W.D. Wash. 1996) (enjoining
the defendant's use of"candyland.com" for its sexually explicit site). In fact, Hasbro was one
of the first federal dilution claims to be decided by a district court.
2'415 U.S.C. § 1127 (Supp. 1996).
'o

See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1XH).

See Serad, supra note 201, at 219. For example, in Accuride Int'l, Inc. u. Accuride
Corp., 871 F.2d 1531, 1539, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1589, 1595 (9th Cir. 1989), the Ninth
Circuit held that "[ilt is clear that anti-dilution statutes ... are designed to protect only
strong, well-recognized marks."
2o"15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(B).
' Id. The Act also contains exceptions for comparative commercial advertising, see 15
U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(A), and all forms of news reporting and news commentary, see 15 U.S.C.

§ 1125(c)(4)(C).
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Furthermore, the legislative history associated with the Act
suggests that the "noncommercial use" exception may be far
broader than the set of activities that fall outside the Lanham Act's
"in commerce" requirement. °9 In introducing the bill on the
Senate floor, Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) declared, "[tihe proposal
adequately addresses legitimate First Amendment concerns
espoused by the broadcasting industry and the media. The bill will
not prohibit or threaten noncommercial expression, such as parody,
satire, editorial and other forms of expression that are not a part
of a commercial transaction."210 Of course, as discussed earlier,
many of these forms of expression can constitute a use "in commerce" under the trademark infringement or unfair competition
laws.21' Moreover, state dilution statutes have long been used to
enjoin parody, specifically when the offending use may drain a
mark's ability to denote the source of a product.2"2 Thus, the
federal dilution statute may actually provide less protection
from
213
blurring and tarnishment than do existing state laws.
Despite Senator Hatch's proclamation, it is unclear whether the
Act does in fact create such a broad exemption. Contrary to his
assertion, the House Report characterized the exception far more
narrowly, noting that "[tihe bill will not prohibit or threaten

2" See supra notes 134-163 and accompanying text.
210 141 CONG. REC. S19,310 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (emphasis
added).
211See supra notes 151-163 and accompanying text.
21
1 See, e.g., Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 44, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1936,
1939 (2d Cir. 1994) (enjoining defendant's parody of plaintiffs trademark under New York's
dilution statute where it was used in advertising for a competing product).
21.Of course, many states do not have dilution statutes. One purpose of the federal
statute was to eliminate the disparities among the states. In the context of the Internet,
however, the problem of different laws in different states may be immaterial. Although the
case law on jurisdiction is far from settled, some courts have held that a Web site owner can
be subject to personal jurisdiction if her site can be accessed by Internet users in a particular
state. See, e.g., EDIAS Software Int'l, L.L.C. v. BASIS Int'l, Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413 (D. Ariz.
1996); see also Karin Mika & Aaron J. Reber, Internet JusidictionalIssues: Fundamental
Fairness in a Virtual World, 30 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1169 (1997) (arguing that a nonresident's virtual presence in the forum state can be the basis for in personam jurisdiction
if traditional jurisdictional standards are met). A Web site owner can be held liable under
whichever state's dilution law is most favorable to the plaintiff, so long as that state also
subscribes to this broad conception of personal jurisdiction. Thus, in the Internet context,
it matters little whether a particular state has a dilution law or not, since an aggrieved
plaintiff can forum shop and file in whatever state maximizes her odds of winning.
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'noncommercial expression,' as that term has been defined by the
courts."214 Given the federal judiciary's broad interpretation of
the "in commerce" requirement under other Lanham Act sections,
the House Report suggests that parodies that fall within the realm
of commercial activitya-including those that trigger the "doctrine
of commercial interference"--might still be actionable. Since the
passage of the Act, judges have also been unable to agree on
whether parody enjoys a blanket exemption from the trademark
dilution law.215 Thus, it is too early to tell whether or not the
federal courts will apply the Act to enjoin specific forms of parody.
Regardless, the dilution law remedy may be unnecessary in this
context, because courts have held, in recent decisions such as Bucci
and Intermatic,that parodists who procure official-sounding domain
names are bound to cause confusion.216 Therefore, the Federal
Dilution Act may well be superfluous-at least for those individuals
and companies who have registered their trademarks with the
PTO.
D. PARODY AND PRIVACY

In addition to federal trademark violations, a campaign that
suffers from a parody spoof can seek relief based on a number of
common law and state statutory tort claims. This section first
considers the validity of tort claims for injuries suffered by a
candidate's reputation and emotional health. I then examine
whether political parodies can violate the common law tort of false
light. Finally, I evaluate causes of action available under state
publicity rights laws.

214H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 4 (1995).

" Compare Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1559, 157374 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (exempting defendant's parody of The Cat in the Hat from the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act based on the court's interpretation of the Act's legislative history),

affd 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 27 (1997), and Elvis Presley Enters.,
Inc. v. Capece, 950 F. Supp. 783, 802 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (refusing to enjoin defendant's use of
the name "The Velvet Elvis" for his bar on First Amendment grounds), with Wawa, Inc. v.
Haaf, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1629, 1631 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 7, 1996) ("The injury which the
recently enacted legislation sought to redress is an illegitimate undermining of a famous
mark by tarnishment, blurring or parody."), affd 116 F.3d 471 (3d Cir. 1997).
214 See Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1430
(S.D.N.Y. 1997); Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
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1. Libel, Defamation, and Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress. Since New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,"7 the Supreme
Court has consistently held that a speaker is liable for damages
caused to the reputation of a "public figure"21 only if the statement was made "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not." 9 Because a rule that
punished assertions that were merely false would have a "chilling
effect" on robust political debate,"2 the New York Times Court
adopted the "actual malice" standard, which protects the public's
interest in the free dissemination of ideas.221 In Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,222 the Supreme Court noted that parody has
"undoubtedly had an effect on the course and outcome of contemporaneous debate."223 Because the Hustler parody could not be
"reasonably believable"224 it could not comport with the "actual
malice" standard, regardless of the publisher's true motive.22
In our hypothetical case of Dole v. Talley, though there has been
documented evidence of actual confusion among visitors who were
unclear whether the "dole96.org" site was officially sponsored by
the Dole campaign,22 this does not necessarily infer that com376 U.S. 254 (1964).
The issue of who counts as a public figure has been considered by the Supreme Court
many times. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974) (holding that an
attorney representing a plaintiff in a high profile civil suit is not a public figure); Curtis
Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154-55 (1967) (finding that plaintiffs who commanded a
.substantial amount of public interest" at the time of the defamatory publication were public
figures); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 87 (1966) (remanding to the trial judge to
determine if the respondent was indeed a public figure). Since then, many lower courts have
addressed the public figure question. See Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Who Is a 'Public
Figure"for Purposesof Defamation Action, 44 A.L.R. 5th 193 (1996). Any elected official or
individual who has, or appears to the public to have, substantial responsibility or control of
government
is considered a public'figure. See Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 85.
219
New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279-80.
Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51-52 (1988). The Hustler case involved a
parody of a Campari liquor ad that lampooned the Reverend Jerry Falwell. Playing on the
double entendre of the phrase "first time," the parody intimated that Falwell's "first time"
had been with his mother. Falwell was not happy. See generally RODNEY A. SMOLLA, JERRY
217

21

1

FALwELL V. LARRY FLYNT: THE FIRST AMENDMENT ON TRIAL (1991).
2

New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279-80.
485 U.S. 46 (1988).

t
's

Id. at 55.
Id. at 57.
See id. at 53 (citing Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 85 (1964)).
See supra notes 106-111 and accompanying text.
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ments on the parodists' Web site were "reasonably believable."
Although an Internet user's lack of familiarity with the World Wide
Web may increase the likelihood that she would become confused
as to the actual source of the information,22 her ability to judge
the plausibility of the site's comical assertions remains undiminished. In this case, viewers are no more likely to believe the actual
228
content of the site than they would a Saturday Night Live skit
229 Thus, with regard to
or an "outrageous" ad parody in Hustler.
claims of defamation, libel, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress, parody should retain the same degree of legal protection
in cyberspace that it has earned in other media. When the victim
is a public figure, the remedy is generally limited to self-help. 3
Public figures are encouraged to use available speech opportunities
(in particular mass media) to contradict the lies or correct the
errors, so as to minimize the negative impact on his or her reputation.23 1 Since public officials have greater access to channels of
communication, they will have better opportunities to counter false
statements and thus need not petition the judiciary for assistance. 2

22' See Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1430, 1438
(S.D.N.Y. 1997).
' SaturdayNight Live was a late-night television program on NBC during the 1970s and
80s that lampooned, among other things, politicians, social issues, celebrities, and other
television shows. The show was perhaps best known for its political sketches, specifically
its caricatures of American presidents. See generally SATURDAY NIGHT LIVE: THE FIRST

TWENTY YEARS (Michael Cader ed., 1994). It was often quite hysterical. In theory, the same

show is still on today on Saturday nights at 11:30 PM. However, today's show is not nearly
as funny.
Hustler Mag., Inc., 484 U.S. at 55.
See Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 164 (1979).
" See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974).
2
3See
id. There is some question as to what remains of the "public figure" doctrine in
the online world. It is possible that in many instances of libel and defamation in cyberspace,
the victim may be held to be a "limited purpose public figure." A limited purpose public
figure (1) voluntarily participates in a discussion about a public controversy; and (2) has
access to the media to get his or her own view across. See Barry v. Time, Inc., 584 F. Supp.
1110, 1113-22 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Reader's Digest Ass'n v. Superior Court, 690 P.2d 610,615-16
(Cal. 1984). Most instances of online defamation can be countered with a similar or
proportionate response (e.g., the victim of a defamatory Web page could put up his own Web
page in response, the victim of a defamatory e-mail could distribute a reply to everyone who
received the original message, etc.). Thus, anyone who participates in an online discussion
could be held to be a public figure for this limited purpose.
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2. False Light. Publicity that places the plaintiff in a false light
in the eye of the public is actionable in many states.2 33 The
statements need not be false; they must only "create [] a false image
of a person that would be offensive to a reasonable person. " "
This tort is similar to defamation, yet need not entail a direct
attack on the victim. Rather, the cause of action is typically
invoked by plaintiffs where the victim is cast in a false light
through "exaggeration or distortion of facts, innuendo, or fictionalization. 23 5
Again, for this tort to apply, the defendant's statement must be
both offensive to a reasonable person and must be "reasonably
believable" by the public. The Supreme Court has held that even
private citizens, let alone public figures, must prove actual malice
to prevail on a claim of false light.23 6 Thus, where the individual
involved is a public figure, the equities generally tip in favor of the
public interest and the false light claim is disallowed. Furthermore, where there is a disclaimer of some sort, there can be no
liability, since the disclaimer eliminates the possibility that the
message might be reasonably believed. 3 7
As such, the jokes about Senator Dole constitute the easy
case-few people would actually believe, if they thought about it,
that Dole once forced the nation of Turkey to consume more
bananas. However, if Talley and Pace had, for example, asserted
that Pat Buchanan had once been a member of the Ku Klux
Klan, 238 a cause of action might be viable were Buchanan able to

See ScOTT, supra note 125, § 12.06, at 12-8.
Id. § 12.06, at 12-8.
I' § 12.06, at 12-9.
ld.

See Time, Inc., v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387 (1967).
Cf Byrd v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 433 So. 2d 593, 595 (Fla. App. 1983) (holding that a
caption suggesting that a photo of the plaintiff had been retouched "sufficiently clarified the
meaning of the picture so that the two, taken together, formed a publication that was neither

fake nor defamatory"); Consumers Union v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1052 (2d
Cir. 1983) ("Disclaimers are a favored way of alleviating consumer confusion as to source or
sponsorship."). But cf. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications, 28 F.3d 769, 774 (8th
Cir. 1994) (holding that a disclaimer will not excuse unauthorized use when the disclaimer
is "virtually undetectable").
2
Note that this is just a hypothetical; I am not asserting that Pat Buchanan is, or ever
was, a member of the Klan. But cf Carol McGraw, Distrust of BuchananSurfaces Among
O.C. Jews, ORANGE COUNTY (CAL.) REG., Mar. 22, 1996, at B6 (recounting tales of protestors
at Buchanan rallies displaying signs reading "Pat = Duke Without the Sheets" that referred
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show (1) that it would be reasonable for people to believe the
statement, (2) that he suffered actual damage to his reputation or
emotional health, and (3) that the attack was made with actual
malice. Similarly, if the parodists attacked President Clinton with
fictitious charges of political corruption or having engaged in
improper sexual behavior, the President might have a valid claim
were he able to prove actual malice. This again demonstrates the
parody paradox as defined by the Second Circuit in Cliffs Notes: A
parody must simultaneously create the impression both that it is,
and that it is not, the original." 9 If the parody does not adequately convey that it is not the real thing, it could be found
"reasonably believable," and would merit significantly less constitutional protection; likewise, if it cannot create the impression that
it is the real thing, it has failed as a parody, for the viewer will not
associate it with the original. Regardless, the difficulty in proving
actual malice would make it difficult for any public figure, let alone
a political candidate, 240 to sustain a claim on the ground of false

light alone.24 '
3. The Right of Publicity. The right of publicity refers to an
individual's right to control the commercial use of his or her
identity.242 First recognized by the Supreme Court in Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,243 the privilege has evolved
over the last two decades to protect celebrities from the commercial
misappropriation of their names,244 nicknames,245 images,246
to former Rep. and KKK member David Duke); Elissa Papirno, Columnists Get Wide Latitude
to Express Their Views, HARTFORD COURANT, Mar. 17, 1996, at C3 (acknowledging complaints
that the Courant had depicted Buchanan as a member of the KKK).
' See Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g Group, 886 F.2d 490, 494 (2d
Cir. 1989).
' It is conceivable that attacks by a political competitor could constitute "actual malice"
if the comments were made by a candidate out of anger or spite towards her opponent.
However, given our interest in encouraging robust and unfettered political debate, see New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964), it is unlikely that any court would find
a candidate liable for political attacks, absent evidence of overwhelming malice.
'" Other common law "privacy torts" include intrusion, see Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d
986 (2d Cir. 1973), public disclosure of embarrassing facts, see Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91 (Cal.
1931), and the right of publicity, see infra Subsection III.D.3.
242 See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 132, § 28:1, at 28-3.
2

433 U.S. 562, 562 (1977).

' See, e.g., Edison v. Edison Polyform Mfg. Co., 67 A. 392 (N.J. Ch. 1907) (granting an
injunction against the defendant company to restrain it from using the plaintiffs name as
a part of its corporate title or in connection with its business or advertising).
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voices,"" and even phrases merely associated with their identities.2 4 Today the doctrine has been recognized in many, though
not all, states. 24 9
These rights apply only against "commercial" uses of name or
likeness;"5 yet, where the appropriation concerns some matter of
public interest, such as a newsworthy event, the First Amendment
generally outweighs the celebrity's publicity rights. Unlike the
privacy torts, however, the actual malice standard does not apply.
Under this body of law, the "fundamental objection is not that the
commercial use is offensive, but that the individual has not been
compensated .... The harm to feelings, if any, is usually minimal." 251' Therefore, a public figure can maintain a cause of action
so long as the misappropriation is commercial in nature and not a
matter "reasonably related to a matter of public interest."252 In
general, courts balance the equities between the individual's
publicity rights and the public's interest in the free flow of
information.253
The parody defense to a right of publicity claim is similar to the
fair use exception under copyright law. 2 4 Typically, "the ultimate decision as to whether or not there is a fair use is the

2

See Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129 (Wis. 1979) (determining that
the plaintiff did have a cause of action under Wisconsin common law where the defendant
marketed products using the plaintiff's nickname "Crazylegs").
' See, e.g., Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 728, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1021, 1025
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (restraining the defendant publisher's activities in order to protect the
plaintiff's interest in the profitability of his public reputation or "persona").
47
See, e.g., Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1398 (9th Cir.
1988) (holding that a singer had a cause of action where the defendant used a "sound alike"
in its advertisements).
See Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 837, 218 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 1, 6 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that plaintiff Johnny Carson's right of publicity was
invaded by the intentional appropriation of his identity for commercial exploitation by the
defendant's use of the phrase "Here's Johnny!").
24

See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West Supp. 1997); N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51

(McKinney 1992).
2o Zacchini v. Scripps.Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562,573-74,205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 741,
749 (1977).
"' Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, Co., 603 P.2d 425, 435.36, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1090,
1103 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
h Stern v. Delphi Internet Servs. Co., 626 N.Y.S.2d 694, 698-99 (Sup. Ct. 1995).
See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 578.
See SCOTT, supra note 125, § 11.051C], at 11-30.
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commercial/nonprofit distinction."255 Thus, when the commercial
aspect of the use is slight or vague, the parody defense will be
difficult to overcome.
Where politicians are involved, regardless of the entertainment
value their behavior provides, the standards are especially high.
For example, in Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc.,2' a New
York state court refused to enjoin a publisher from selling posters
emblazoned with a photograph of Pat Paulsen, a comedian making
a humorous run at the presidency, above the words "For President."25 Despite the fact that Paulsen had negotiated an extensive merchandising program with another company,25 8 the court
noted that the national political scene "is itself always 'newsworthy' " and thus Paulsen's interests "must bow to the superior public
interest in completely unfettered and unabridged free discussion of
9
whatever persuasion, merit or style."2
Similarly, in Stern v. Delphi Internet Services Corp.,260 the
same court, more than twenty-five years later, ruled that Delphi's
use of a bare buttocks photo of Howard Stern (then a candidate for
Governor of New York) to advertise its Internet news service was
also a privileged use. 2 1' The court held that informing subscribers about the contents of the online service was indeed a "newsworthy use of a private person's name or photograph [that would]
not give rise to a cause of action ... as long as the use is reasonably related to a matter of public interest."21 2 Regardless of the
medium used to inform the public, the fact that "the format may
deviate from traditional patterns of political commentary, or that
to some it may appear more entertaining than informing, [will] not

2m

Id. § I1.05[A], at 11-30.

" 299 N.Y.S:2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
'v Id. at 503-04.

Paulsen had granted an exclusive license to a California company for the production
of all campaign materials. See hi. at 504.
259 Id. at 507.
'm 626 N.Y.S.2d 694 (Sup. Ct. 1995).
2' See id. at 701 ("The fact that the advertisement also contained Stem's photograph...
cannot transform a privileged use into an unlawful use when the goal of the advertisement-to inform potential subscribers about the contents of the on-line service and induce
them to purchase it-remains unchanged.").
Id. at 698-99.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol5/iss2/6

48

Oram: Will the Real Candidate Please Stand Up?: Political Parody On the

1998]

POLITICAL PARODY

515

alter its protected status."2" Thus, even where a defendant has
appropriated a politician's image for its own commercial profit, it
is unlikely that a politician could prevail on a publicity rights
claim." 4
E. PARODY AND ELECTION LAW

When the Pete Wilson presidential campaign noticed the parody
Talley and Pace had established at "wilson96.org," its lawyers
threatened the pranksters with criminal charges of violating federal
election laws. 2r' However, federal election law currently covers
only fraudulent misrepresentation of campaign authority made by
an actual employee or agent of a federal candidate.2
Thus,
while the law would apply if operatives from one candidate's
campaign played "dirty tricks" on another's,267 the law is silent on

' Paulsen, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 507-08.
One interesting question that deserves further consideration is whether the treatment
of politicians under the right of publicity doctrine might evolve as more and more politicians
participate in product advertisements upon leaving office. Recent examples include Bob Dole
(Visa and Air France), Ann Richards (Doritos), Mario Cuomo (Doritos), Dan Quayle (Lay's
Potato Chips), Geraldine Ferraro (Pepsi), and Mikhail Gorbachev (Pizza Hut). See Robert
P. Laurence, Politicos Get Their Share of Huckster Pie, SAN DIEGO UNION & TRIB., Jan. 13,
1998, at E6 ("We've come to expect the loser of an election to make more than the winner
... ."). With politicians capitalizing on the commercial value of their publicity rights,
perhaps the courts will be willing to grant more protection to their images.
' See Letter from Brooks Talley to the author, supra note 117.
2" The statute reads:
No person who is a candidate for Federal office or an employee or agent of
such a candidate shall-(1) fraudulently misrepresent himself or any
committee or organization under his control as speaking or writing or
otherwise acting for or on behalf of any other candidate or political party or
employee or agent thereof on a matter which is damaging to such other
candidate or political party or employee or agent thereof ....
2 U.S.C. § 441(h) (1994). A prohibition on publication and distribution of anonymous
political paraphernalia, once codified at 18 U.S.C. § 612, was repealed in 1976. See Pub. L.
No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 496 (1976).
2
See, e.g., Grimes v. Smith, 585 F. Supp. 1084, 1086-88 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (accusing
defendant of organizing a conspiracy to pay an individual with the same surname of his
political opponent to seek the same office), affd 776 F.2d 1359 (7th Cir. 1985); Tomei v.
Finley, 512 F. Supp. 695, 696 (N.D. I11. 1981) (enjoining defendant's use of the acronym
"REP" to represent his newly-formed Representation for Every Person party in a township
election); United States v. Insco, 365 F. Supp. 1308, 1310 (M.D. Fla. 1973) (recounting
defendant's distribution of bumper stickers reading "McGOVERN-GUNTER" where Gunter
was his opponent in a congressional election); People v. Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978, 981-82
2"
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the role of unaffiliated individuals, such as the parodists at issue
here. 268

The parodists might be liable under common law or

criminal fraud, but such efforts are also entitled to significant-though not absolute-First Amendment protection, given the
Supreme Court's fear that subjecting candidates and campaigns to
potential liability may chill robust political debate.
The discussion of political affairs is among the most carefully
protected of all forms of speech. 269 This proposition reflects our
nation's "profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wideopen." 7 ° As a result, restrictions on political expression require
the state to demonstrate a compelling interest sufficient to justify
limitations on First Amendment freedoms." 1 Since the threat of
government sanctions may unnecessarily deter desirable expression, any such regulation must be narrowly drawn so that its effect
is no greater than absolutely necessary to achieve the compelling
272
state interest.
However, preventing fraud, false advertising, libel, and election
disorder can all serve as legitimate state concerns.27 3 When a
statute's value to the public far outweighs any infringement of free
speech rights, such laws may be upheld.274 Courts typically

(Sup. Ct.) (describing letters sent by Republicans that purported to be from the Liberal
Party), affd 354 N.Y.S.2d 129 (App. Div. 1974); BRUCE L. FELKNOR, POLICAL MISCHIEF:
SMEAR, SABOTAGE, AND REFORM IN U.S. ELECTIONS (1992) (noting numerous occasions of

campaign fraud throughout American history).
Talley and Pace were not acting as employees or agents of any presidential candidate;
in fact, both are avowed Libertarians and thus equal opportunity offenders. See Cross, supra
note 12 (indicating that Pace and Talley had created parodies that mocked Democrats and
Republicans alike).
See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 346-47 (1995) (holding that
political speech is at the core of the First Amendment protections); Eu v. San Francisco
County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989) (recognizing that debate is
integral to the operation of government); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265,272 (1971)
(stating that First Amendment guarantees have their "fullest and most urgent application
precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office").
270 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
"' See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 806 (1983).
'7"See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 63-64 (1960).
2'See United States v. Scott, 195 F. Supp 440, 444 (D.N.D. 1961).
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undertake such a balancing test2 75 or employ the "actual malice"
standard276 when campaign speech is targeted by the state. Both
doctrines allow the courts to accommodate the public's interest in
free expression in determining the legitimacy of the state's interest
in controlling and protecting the electoral process.
Furthermore, these sites cannot be banned merely because they
Anonymous speech has
are anonymous political statements.
played an important role in our nation's political history 27 8 and
often provides the only opportunity for a speaker to avoid retaliation, social ostracism, or other private sanctions. 279 Thus, the
government cannot force a parodist to place his name or political
affiliation on his Web site, even if his anonymity does spark
curiosity or confusion as to the site's true source.280
In our hypothetical case, the same protections that shield speech
against privacy and publicity tort claims would apply to protect
Web sites from undue restrictions imposed by election laws.
Because par6dy can function' as protected political expression, it
must be tolerated even at the risk of allowing some misrepresentations of fact to seep into the electoral process. Yet although
election laws cannot be too restrictive, speech that would otherwise
be actionable does not gain immunity merely because it is made
within the context of an election. As such, I turn now to the issue
of whether so-called "core political speech""1 might be entitled to
broader First Amendment protection than speech that merely
comments on other social or cultural issues.

275

See, e.g., id. at 443 ("Trial courts are well advised to weigh the circumstances and

appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the enactment of legislation
when its constitutionality is under attack.").
' See, e.g., Vanasco v. Schwartz, 401 F. Supp. 87, 92-93 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (applying the
actual malice standard to state regulation of political speech), affd 423 US. 1041 (1976).
27
' See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995); Talley, 362 U.S. at 6364; Stewart v. Taylor, 953 F. Supp. 1047 (S.D. Ind. 1997); People v. White, 506 N.E.2d 1284
(Il. 1987); People v. Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978 (Sup. Ct.), affd 354 N.Y.S.2d 129 (App. Div.
1974).
21 The best example of this is, of course, THE FEDERALIST.
27 See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1516.
2
Cf ACLU v. Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (finding a Georgia statute not
narrowly tailored to achieve the end of fraud protection because it encompassed Internet
transmissions that-although they may have falsely identified the sender-were not

fraudulent under the criminal code).
"' McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1519.
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F. DOES POLITICAL SPEECH MERIT SPECIAL PROTECTION?

Ask Americans on the street why we have the First Amendment
and most would probably mention the importance of allowing free
discourse and debate over public issues and the qualifications of
candidates.282 According to the Supreme Court, the Constitution's
guarantee of freedom of speech-particularly political speech-was
intended "to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas."" 3
However, on occasion it becomes necessary to break out the fetters
so that the democratic process can thrive. The Supreme Court has
long recognized the vital role of political discourse in determining
the future of our nation. For example, in 1995, the Court declared,
"[iin a republic where the people are sovereign, the ability of the
citizenry to make informed choices among candidates for office is
essential, for the identities of those who are elected will inevitably
shape the course that we follow as a nation."284 Thus, "[plreserving the integrity of the electoral process, preventing corruption, and
'sustain(ing) the active, alert responsibility of the individual citizen
in a democracy for the wise conduct of government' are interests of
the highest importance."285
Hence, some restrictions on political expression can be justified.
For example, an individual's free speech rights do not entitle him
to infringe a candidate's intellectual property rights.286 Preventing marketplace confusion and creating incentives for innovation
are important economic policies; even the benefits of free and unfettered exchange rarely trump these vital state interests.
While characterizing speech as "political" may appeal to one's
conception of why we need the First Amendment in the first place,

'" Cf New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 296-97 (1964) (Black, J., concurring)
("[Fireedom to discuss public affairs and public officials is unquestionably, as the Court today
holds, the kind of speech the First Amendment was primarily designed to keep within the
area of free discussion.").
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
2 McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1519.
2' First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788-89 (1978) (quoting United States v.
International Union of United Auto. Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 575 (1957)).
' See supra Parts III.A-C; see also Eugene Volokh & Brett McDonnell, Freedom of Speech
and Independent Judgment Review in Copyright Cases, 107 YALE L.J. (forthcoming June
1998) (discussing the procedural safeguards that accompany speech restrictions in copyright

cases).
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it is dangerous to categorize different forms of speech according to
content. Allowing a court to pass on the merits of a particular idea
or assertion, particularly an unpopular one, gives judges control
over what the people see, hear, and think. Therefore, we allow
restrictions on certain broad categories of speech that are undesirable in one way or another based on content-yet we generally do
not make determinations based on the speaker's viewpoint. As a
result, it is doubtful whether such distinctions between political
speech and other forms of expression can justify affording a
stronger shield to speech that can be characterized as "political."
This issue has been a difficult one for the Supreme Court to
resolve. For example, in its most recent relevant decision, R.A.V.
v. City of St. Paul,28 7 the Court endorsed a categorical approach
to regulating speech, explaining that restrictions are only permissible on certain categories of speech that are " 'of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
These categories can be regulated because of their
morality.' "'
distinctively proscribable content (e.g., obscenity, commercial
speech, etc.).289 However, within these proscribablecategories, the
government may not discriminate on the basis of content. For
example, a state may prohibit obscenity which is patently offensive
in its prurience, but it may not ban only obscene political messages.2" 0 Likewise, although a state may proscribe verbal threats
that tend to provoke violence, it may not forbid only that subcategory of hate speech which insults " 'on the basis of race, color, creed,
religion or gender.' "291 However, this analysis suggests that
political obscenity and bias-motivated messages may be regulated,
so long as the entire constitutionally proscribable category of speech
is similarly restrained. Thus, there is no "special protection" for
certain subcategoriesof expression, such as political speech, so long

505 U.S. 377 (1992).
Id. at 383 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
's See id. at 383-84.
9
2
See id. at 388; see also Kucharek v. Hanaway, 902 F.2d 513, 517 (7th Cir. 1990) ("The
state is permitted to suppress obscenity but it is not permitted to distort the marketplace
of erotic discourse by suppressing only that obscenity which conveys a disfavored message.").
27

2' R.A V., 505 U.S. at 380.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 1998

53

520

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 6

J. INTELL. PROP. L.

[Vol. 5:467

as the restriction on the category is, as a whole, permissible.29 2
Despite its obvious social value, political speech is subject to the
same time, place, and manner restrictions as are other forms of
social commentary. In fact, as Justice White noted in his concurring opinion in R.A.V., in some settings political speech may
actually be entitled to less constitutional protection than even socalled "fighting words."29 3
R.A.V. suggests that within certain contexts, a plea of "political
speech" will not exempt offensive expression from state regulation.
Broad prophylactic measures that restrict free expression can be
tolerated so long as they are narrowly tailored to further the state's
compelling interest and nothing more. Hence, an artist's photographic enlargement of a fifty dollar Federal Reserve note can
violate counterfeiting laws-despite the fact that the artist replaced
the portrait of President Grant with that of Nixon in an attempt at
political satire.29 4 In the Hustler case, 29 5 Jerry Falwell's mother
(assuming she were not also considered a public figure) would
likely have had a successful cause of action for emotional distress,
defamation, or libel-even though the mock advertisement also
lampooned a political activist. Furthermore, an anti-nuclear
activist can be enjoined from selling "Mutant of Omaha" T-shirts
that display a design confusingly similar to the Mutual of Omaha
trademark. 296 And a court can strip an abortion foe of Planned
Parenthood's domain name when his use is likely to cause confusion among Net users.29 7 So long as alternative avenues of
expression that do not conflict with compelling state interests
remain available, restrictions such as these do not deprive the
public of the benefit of these political ideas.
Of course, none of the above cases surrounded a campaign for the
presidency of the United States. However, each did involve

'See City Council ofL.A v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984) (refusing to hold
an ordinance banning the posting of signs on public property unconstitutional as applied to
expressive activity in support of a political candidate).
23R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 406 n.8 (White, J., concurring).
See Wagner v. Simon, 412 F. Supp. 426 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); see supra notes 222-225 and
accompanying text.
See Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987).
See Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1430

(S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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discussions of politicians and controversial public policy issues that
certainly would have been no less deserving of First Amendment
protection-had they not implicated other compelling state
interests. The Supreme Court has established that "even though
political speech is entitled to the fullest possible measure of
constitutional protection, there are a host of other communications
that command the same respect."29 What is more, the Court has
also suggested that speech regarding the election of candidates (i.e.,
political advertisements) may be subject togreaterrestrictions than
speech related to other issues of public concern because of the
state's interest in purging corruption from the electoral process.299
Therefore, under all manifestations of trademark law, the
"parody defense" earns no additional potency merely because the
victim is a politician."° The analysis remains the same. As a
result, the fact situation in a hypothetical Dole v. Talley lawsuit is
analogous to Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. v.
Bucci. Like Planned Parenthood, Senator Dole would likely have,
at the very least, a valid trademark claim to the domain address
that contained his name. Thus, likelihood of confusion may provide
courts with ample justification to stamp out political parody on the
Web.
IV. How IS THE INTERNET DIFFERENT FROM OTHER MEDIA?

Every medium that transmits ideas and expression has special
characteristics that raise unique legal questions. Signs on public
property "constitute a clutter and visual blight."01 Broadcast

2w City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789. 816 (1984); see also ACLU
v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 881 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (opinion of Dalzell, J.) (stating that dialogue

between Federalists and Anti-Federalists is "from a constitutional perspective, equally
important" to that of "aspiring artists, or French cooks, or dog lovers, or fly fisherman"), affd
117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) (upholding a ban
on independent corporate expenditures in connection with federal election campaigns). But
cf id. at 676 (Brennan, J., concurring) (reiterating that under FirstNational Bank v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765 (1978), states may not prohibit corporations from making many other types of
political expenditures, e.g., advertisements in support or opposition to ballot initiatives).
'8 However, the defense is strengthened against some privacy tort claims when the
victim is a public figure. See supra Section III.D.
"01
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 794.
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frequencies are a "scarce resource [that] must be portioned out
among applicants" 30 2 to prevent certain voices from being barred
from the airways." Even oral solicitation of votes can be suspect
when it occurs in close proximity to a polling site.3°4 The Court
has long recognized that "differences in the characteristics of new
media justify differences in the First Amendment standards applied
to them."" 5 With regard to the Internet, the same properties
that make the medium so valuable and exciting also raise the
potential for abuse and misuse.
What is so novel about the Net that it should require refining
and redesigning existing legal rules? First, the Internet "provides
an easy and inexpensive way for a speaker to reach a large
audience, potentially of millions."0 6 On the Internet, the start-up
and operating costs of mass political speech are significantly less
than what would be required to reach a similar audience through
traditional media. Second, the Internet is a relative newcomer to
the telecommunications scene, and thus most of its users still
remain relatively unfamiliar with its protocol. This factor increases
the likelihood that Web users will face confusion as they surf
through cyberspace. Third, unlike visual and verbal trademarks,
domain names are a scarce resource. °7 Each individual address
can be used by one and only one Web site.3"8 As a result, parties

CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101 (1973).
See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969).
3o See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 208-10 (1992).
3o FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984) (quoting Red Lion Broad.
Co., 395 U.S. at 386).
ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 843 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
"o The universe of possible words from which trademarks might be selected is rather
enormous and unlikely to become depleted in the near future. As a result, most commentators believe in the assumption that "marks are fungible and their number infinite." Stephen
L. Carter, The Trouble with Trademark, 99 YALE L.J. 759, 770 (1990) (citing William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON.
265,274 (1987)); see also Coca-Cola Co. v. Old Dominion Beverage Corp., 271 F. 600,604 (4th
Cir. 1921) (noting that though the court refused to allow the defendant to employ the
plaintiff's mark, "[all the rest of infinity is open" for the defendant's use). But cf Carter,
supra, at 788 (arguing that the assumption that marks are fungible and infinite does not
hold for all categories of trademarks, and concluding that the "legal protection of marks
impoverishes the available market language").
3 The proposals to add additional top-level domains may help mitigate this problem.
See infra notes 342-345 and accompanying text. For example, Apple Computer could register
"apple.com" and Apple Records could employ "apple.biz." However, so long as ".com" remains
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who employ similar marks are forced into direct competition for
Web traffic, even if their messages or markets are entirely distinct.
Finally, the World Wide Web is not a "pervasive" medium like
broadcasting; it does not invade the home and confront the viewer.
Rather, the user has to seek out information through a timeconsuming process of typing and clicking if he is to enjoy the
benefits of cyberspace communication.
These factors, taken together, have generated a hypersensitivity
among courts 3 9 and legislatures,310 both eager to promote traditional, regulated, controlled discourse over this new medium.
Reflecting a fear that cyberspace is chaotic and uncontrollable, legal
institutions have kept a close watch on the development of the
Internet.
By affording individual citizens of limited means the ability to
reach a world-wide audience, the World Wide Web significantly
311
furthers the democratization of political and social discourse.
Although the relative absence of government regulation over this
medium has "unquestionably produced a kind of chaos," the
benefits of free and unfettered exchange generally outweigh the
costs of cacophony.312 The political parody problem reflects the
government's fear that "too much speech occurs in that medium,

the dominant top-level domain, ".com" addresses will remain the most desirable, and the
controversies over which party is entitled to "apple.com" will continue.
'See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
30 See, e.g., Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)-(h) (Supp. 1996), invalidated
in part by Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-93.1 (1981)
(criminalizing the transmission of data through a computer network if such data uses a
name, trade name, trademark, logo, seal, or copyrighted symbol to falsely identify the
person), invalidatedby ACLU v. Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228 (N.D. Ga. 1997); Internet Freedom
and Child Protection Act of 1997, H.R. 774, 105th Cong. §§ 1-3 (requiring Internet service
providers to make screening software available to all customers); Federal Internet Privacy
Protection Act of 1997, H.R. 1367, 105th Cong. §§ 1-2 (providing legal remedies for cases in
which confidential records are made available through the Internet by federal agencies);
Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 1997, S. 474, 105th Cong. §§ 1-5.
31 See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 881 (opinion of Dalzell, J.) The best example of
this effect is Matt Drudge. Drudge is a self-acclaimed reporter who publishes his news
reports on the World Wide Web. See Matt Drudge, Drudge Report (visited Mar. 20, 1998)
<http'J/www.drudgereport.com>. Despite being a one-man operation, Drudge's bulletins now
reach an incredible number of readers. During the eruption of allegations against the
President in January 1998, over 250,000 visitors read Drudge's reports each day. See
Michael Finley, Drudging Up Change on Internet, TIMES UNION ALBANY, Feb. 4, 1998, at D8.
" ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 883.
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and that speech there is too available to the participants."313
Chaos within the electoral process destroys the Internet's promise
of enhanced political discourse. Thus, without any mechanism for
centralized control, the Internet may well remain a "vast wasteland" of cacophony: Too many speakers may well result in no one
being heard.
Furthermore, because most Web traffic today consists of Internet
neophytes, serious potential exists for confusion in cyberspace. For
those worried about Internet confusion, however, parody is far from
the most serious concern. The more severe obstacle is fraud in
Internet commerce.314 Partly in response to the (rarely litigated)
predicament of fraudulent Web sites masquerading as legitimate
commercial enterprises, courts have been wary of unauthorized
trademark use. Thus, judges have broadly construed the "in
commerce" doctrine to encompass mere registration of a domain
address as a commercial use within the reach of the Lanham
Act.3"'
They have characterized Internet users as relatively
unsophisticated with regard to the new medium, in order to
demonstrate that confusion is bound to occur.3 16 Finally, they
have recognized that an "excessive delay" in accessing Internet
information "disrupts the 'flow' on the Internet and stifles both
'hedonistic' and 'goal-directed' browsing." 3 7 Because these delays
lengthen the period between a user's attempt to access a page and
her realization that what she found was not what she was looking
for, at least one court has found that delays of
a few seconds can
318
increase the likelihood of consumer confusion.
Such sweeping interpretations of existing law can help to enjoin
improperly motivated domain appropriations, such as speculative
cyber-squatting and domain-hijacking. However, these broad
3

Id. at 881 (emphasis in original).
See, e.g., People v. Lipsitz, 663 N.Y.S.2d 468 (Sup. Ct. 1997) (describing defendant's
involvement in magazine subscription fraud); Jack Nelson, Grappling With Crime Wave on
the Web,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1997, at A10 (describing various Internet scams).
6
31
See Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. II. 1996); ActMedia, Inc. v.
ActiveMedia Intl, Inc., No. 96C3448, 1996 WL 466527 (N.D. Ill. July 17, 1996); supra notes
134-163
and accompanying text.
8
31 See Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1430, 1438
"

4

"3

(S.D.N.Y.
1997).
7

-8 ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 846.
" See Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1438.
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doctrines threaten to stifle legitimate, desirable uses as well. By
assuming that Internet activity inherently involves a "use in
commerce," and by presuming likelihood of confusion as a result of
delays and a supposed lack of user sophistication, the courts have
been moving towards a rule that unauthorized trademark use on
the Internet is an automatic violation of the Lanham Act. 319
Perhaps, as a public policy objective, this is desirable. It is
doubtful, however, that manipulating existing trademark infringement, dilution, and unfair competition doctrine (and perhaps other
areas of law in the future) is the proper way to achieve this goal.
Thus, finessing trademark principles to extend the reach of the
courts to every domain name controversy presents a question of
"whether new wine can be poured into an old bottle."3 20 The 1946

Lanham Act does not necessarily solve every domain name
controversy; it is imperative that courts recognize this fact.
Moreover, due to netizens' reliance on mnemonic domain names,
Web publishers often compete for visitors based not on what each
has to sell or say, but rather due to their cyber-proximity to their
neighbors-the fact that two sites' domain names may differ by as
little as a single character. Individual domain names are a scarce
resource. A party obtains exclusive use rights for each individual
domain name it registers. As a result, World Wide Web expression
is unique in that one speaker's expression can interfere with that
of his competitor. For example, many visitors to the parody Dole
site must have stumbled upon it while in search of the official
campaign home page. Inevitably, some of them never reached the
real thing, either due to confusion or frustration. Compare this
form of expression to a Saturday Night Live skit: A viewer may
watch a television ad parody that appears similar to the real thing;
however, the telecast merely adds to the total amount of political
propaganda the viewer will encounter during the campaign. It does
not prevent him in any way from viewing actual campaign ads in

"' Cf Thomas F. Pressur & James R. Barney, Trademarks as Metatags: Infringement
or Fair Use?, AIPLA Q.J. (forthcoming 1998) (arguing that some courts are propagating a
rule that all unauthorized trademark use is deceptive per se).
moUnited States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535, 536, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1978, 1978
(D. Mass. 1994); see also Oram, supra note 6 (arguing that the economic principles
underlying trademark law suggest that its application to certain domain name controversies
is somewhat dubious).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 1998

59

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 6

526

J. INTELL. PROP.L.

[Vol. 5:467

other contexts. The candidate remains able to reach that viewer to
the same degree and extent. In contrast, in the online world,
parties are in constant competition for visitors, represented on their
Web-counters as "hits."32 '

The existence of a parody site may

reduce the number of "hits" the official campaign Web site receives.
Thus, a party's control over a similar-sounding domain name can
have a significant impact on the
extent to which another speaker
322
is able to get his message out.

Finally, the World Wide Web is fundamentally different from
traditional forms of communications media, particularly television
broadcasting (which currently accounts for most candidate political
speech123 ). Internet communications do not" 'invade' the individu-

al's home or appear on one's computer screen unbidden."324
Rather, users must hunt for information through a "series of
affirmative steps more deliberate and directed than merely turning
a dial."325 In doing so, they undertake significant search costs in
order to find specific information.3 2' Domain names, like trade-

'21 A "hit" occurs each time a visitor accesses a different file on a Web page.
'2 For example, Steven C. Brodsky, a member of Outreach Judaism, a national
organization dedicated to fighting the group Jews for Jesus, established a Web site at
'jewsforjesus.org." The site advised visitors to follow a link to the Web site of Outreach
Judaism, "to learn more about how the Jews for Jesus cult is founded upon deceit and
distortion of fact." Brodsky acknowledged that his intent in creating the site was "'to
intercept potential converts before they have a chance to see the obscene garbage on the real
J4J site.'" Thus, Brodsky was attempting to keep Web users from viewing Jews for Jesus's
message. Jews for Jesus, whose official Web site was located at "jews-for-jesus.org," filed
suit, alleging, inter alia, trademark infringement. See Jews for Jesus Are Asking Exactly
Who's ForJesus, NATL L.J., Feb. 16, 1998, at A27; see also Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, Civ.
No. 98-274 (AJL), 1998 WL 111676 (D.N.J. Mar. 6, 1998) (granting a preliminary injunction
to restrain Brodsky from using the domain name).
' See Pew Research Ctr., supra note 56 (describing the role television plays in the
electoral process). Similarly, in the New York Senate race between Geraldine Ferraro and
Sen. Alphonse D'Amato (R-NY), a Republican political consultant registered and created a
Web site at "ferraro.com." The site urged visitors to "Vote D'Amato!" before forwarding them
to the official D'Amato campaign site. See Sorensen, supra note 104. Similar to Brosky's
effort, the mock site was intended to prevent viewers from accessing information about
Ferraro and instead forced them to encounter D'Amato's message.
" ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
31 Id. at 845.
'See
Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 207, 212 (1996) (noting that the process by which users find official Web sites is "costly
and can be avoided by correct allocation in the first place").
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marks,127 convey information that allows Net users to limit the
scope of their investigations. Yet, when this source-denoting
information is unreliable, it is the netizens-as well as the Web site
operators-who bear the costs of difficult searches. 28 Hence, it
becomes more difficult for speakers to reach their desired audiences
and tougher for the user to find what she is looking for.
All communications media are not created equal. Courts and
legislatures must appreciate the distinctive qualities of each
specific medium, and must therefore tailor legal solutions to
address these specific peculiarities. In the absence of adequate and
efficient legal rules, however, private parties will pursue their own
private solutions, through the aid of social networks and technological innovations. 29 In Part V, I analyze potential legal, social, and
technical solutions that might help minimize the negative effects of
unfettered political chaos in cyberspace.
V.

POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS

When emerging technologies create new social problems, victims
can resort to three different kinds of responses. They might seek
legal solutions by following traditional judicial, legislative, or
administrative paths. They can harness social forces to circumvent
the problem or to exert pressure on the offending behavior.330 Or,
alternatively, victims may resort to self-help in the form of
technological counterattacks. Judges and legislators should keep
in mind that social and technological solutions, as well as adminis-

See Landes & Posner, supra note 307, at 269-70.
There are numerous "costs of confusion" involved in searching the Web. Among these
are: the cost of developing more advanced search engines and better indexed Web directories,
books that help users find specific sites, and the additional time users must spend online
because their searches take longer (including the hourly charges most service providers
charge for Internet access).
3. One alternative to government policy-making is the virtual community model. This
model suggests an arrangement in which consumers, online providers, and governmental
bodies work together to develop an integrated, cost-benefit approach that considers the
impact of each player's role on the overall system. See Byron F. Marchant, On-Line on the
Internet: FirstAmendment and Intellectual Property Uncertaintiesin the On-Line World, 39
How. L.J. 477, 500-02 (1996).
*' See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE

DIsPuTEs 123-136 (1991) (arguing that social norms can be used to achieve order and control
without resorting to law).
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trative and legislative responses, are legitimate options for
addressing these developing issues.
A. LEGAL REMEDIES

A campaign faced with an offensive Web parody may choose to
pursue any of a number of legal solutions. In Part III, I considered
potential legal claims that could be maintained to enjoin the use of
unauthorized domain names. However, judicial remedies are often
not very realistic, given their costs (both in time and dollars), the
numerous other priorities faced by political candidates, and the
negative press coverage such action would likely provoke. Perhaps
the preferred legal solutions require the involvement of administrative agencies, such as the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) or the Federal Election Commission (FEC). Such administrative actions, however, must still pass muster with the First
Amendment.
There are many possible administrative solutions. For example,
Congress could grant the FCC the authority to make ad hoc
determinations as to which parties are entitled to specific domain
names. Under such a regime, if an applicant requested a domain
that contained a registered trademark, the trademark owner would
have a certain number of days to oppose the application. Such a
policy could be implemented in either of two ways: by stripping NSI
(or its successor) of its authority and undertaking the responsibility
itself,3"' or by granting NSI legal immunity on the condition that
it adopt appropriate procedures and requirements.3 3 2 Since the
Patent and Trademark Office already uses similar procedures to
determine whether new trademark registration applications
infringe existing marks, such a policy would likely be upheld as a
constitutional time, place, or manner restriction. 3 This alternative serves the compelling state interest of reducing consumer

"' Alternatively, the FCC might be advised to delegate the responsibility to the Patent
and Trademark Office, given its expertise in trademark disputes.
' Of course, NSI (or its successor) would probably demand federal funding to develop
such a system, as this program would likely be extremely costly.
. See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S.
522, 536, 541, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1145, 1151-52, 1154 (1987) (implying that trademark
protection can be viewed as a reasonable time, place, or manner restriction).
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confusion as to source or sponsorship. Likewise, the plan is also
narrowly tailored, for it only prevents unauthorized use of marks
as domain names where the mark serves a source-denoting
function. It is essential, however, that such a policy forbid only
registration of domain names that potential Web visitors would
likely find confusing. This may require an expensive registrationby-registration analysis, similar to that currently used for trademark registration. Thus, "dole96.org" would likely be restricted,
but "no-dole96.org" or "dole-parody.org" would not.
This response can be considered analogous to the FCC's scheme
of awarding licenses to those broadcasters the Commission believes
3 4 Under Red Lion, this
best serve the public interest."
system is
constitutional because it involves the allocation of a scarce resource
by a government agency that has the right to attach conditions to
its use. Thus, the FCC, NSF, or NSI could require that the
"dole96.org" domain address only be used to promote a presidential
campaign for a candidate named Dole. This restriction leaves open
numerous alternative avenues for expression by other groups and
individuals, as there would still remain a myriad of domain names
that parodists, political opponents, and even outside groups of Dole
supporters could use in disseminating their messages.3 35
Alternatively, NSI (or its successor) might establish arbitration
proceedings in which parties contesting the ownership of a
particular domain name could sit down together and negotiate a
compromise. 3 6 By bringing the parties together, NSI could help
substantially reduce litigation costs by having a neutral arbitrator

's'
See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1969) (explaining that
broadcast frequencies are allocated among competing applicants "in a manner responsive to
the public 'convenience, interest, or necessity") (quoting Radio Act of 1927, § 4, 44 Stat.
1163). But cf. Easterbrook, supra note 326, at 212-13 (suggesting that the FCC has failed
in its effort to allocate broadcasting licenses via the public interest formula and urging that

domain names be spared from similar treatment).
's' Examples of acceptable addresses might include: "dole-parody.com," "no-dole.com,"
"friends-of-dole.org," 'veterans-for-dole.com," etc. However, such a system creates a
substantial problem for Web parodists, who, it will be remembered, must simultaneously
create the impression that the site both is, and is not, the official campaign home page. If

a parody site is required to employ a domain name such as "dole-parody.com," visitors would
immediately recognize the parody for what it is, leaving the parodists unable to instantaneously perplex their audiences.
"' See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960)
(discussing the social costs of private negotiation).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 1998

63

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 6

530

J. INTELL. PROP. L.

[Vol. 5:467

decide the dispute. Either way, there is much that government can
do to ensure that Web addresses are used in the manner most
consistent with the public interest.
Finally, the Federal Elections Commission could solve the
problem itself by establishing a common host for all official
candidate sites. The FEC could develop a site located at, for
example, "www.election.gov," and assign candidates space on its
own server. Thus, the Dole campaign could have its home page at
"www.election.gov/dole," with the Clinton campaign at
"www.election.gov/clinton," and so forth." 7 In addition, the home
page at "www.election.gov" might contain hypertext links to each
candidate in every race, so that by accessing the FEC election home
page, visitors could jump to the site of the candidate of their choice.
Once the FEC site became established and well-publicized, voters
would know to look for official candidate home pages at
"www.election.gov." Again, this solution could also be expected to
be upheld as constitutional, for it serves the compelling state
interest of informing the electorate. Of course, the FEC would have
to allow every registered candidate equal access, regardless of their
viewpoint, political party, or likelihood of winning.338 In this
context, government action seems an appropriate instrument for
enabling the citizenry to make informed electoral choices.
B. COLLECTIVE SOLUTIONS

Alternatively, a number of extra-governmental solutions could
effectively address the problem. Efforts to solve this dilemma could
be led, for example, by a coalition of disgruntled campaign staffers
or perhaps by organizations dedicated to providing the public with
election information, such as the League of Women Voters or the
California Voter Foundation. In fact, such efforts have already

__ Alternatively, the addresses could be "dole.election.gov,* "clinton.election.gov," or
"perot.election.gov," etc.
'a'However, the FEC might choose to allocate space only to candidates who have gained
access to the ballot in a certain number of states. Such a scheme would be similar to that
established for public financing of presidential campaigns, in which funding is based on
ballot access and the party's past ability to achieve a minimum number of votes in the
previous election. This system was upheld in Buckley u. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108 (1976) (per
curiam).
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begun: In 1996, various public interest groups published Internet
directories which listed and linked to officially-sponsored candidate
sites. 3 9 In the future, popular search engines such as Yahoo!
might list candidate home pages, or better yet, offer individual
voters online sample ballots that link to all of the candidates in
their own districts.340 Alternatively, the candidates themselves
might collectively establish a Web site containing links to each of
their individual campaign home pages.34 ' Once established and
promoted, these sites would assist voters in accessing the information they are looking for, thereby reducing their reliance on domain
names.
The International Ad Hoc Committee's (IAHC) response to the
dilemma of multiple legitimate trademark owners seeking the same
domain name might well address the political parody issue as well.
In response to cases in which two or more organizations with the
rights to identical trademarks for different product classes or
geographical areas seek to register the same domain name, 2 the
IAHC has proposed the creation of additional generic top-level
domains (gTLD's), including ".firm," ".store," ".arts," ".info," and
".rec. " ' This change would allow companies to share common
' See, e.g., California Voter Found., California Online Voter Guide-1996 General
Election (Dec. 30, 1996) <http:J/www.calvoter.orgtcvf/96ger/>; League of Women Voters,
League of Women Voters Election '96 Campaign (visited Mar. 20, 1998) <http'//www.lwv.org/
eleccamp.html>; Project Vote Smart, supra note 54.
3, If a user can enter his zip code and get a listing of all the movies playing in his area,
see MovieLink (modified daily) <http://www.movlielink.com>, or all the television shows on
that night, see TV Guide Entertainment Network, TVgen (modified weekly) <http:/l
www.tvguide.com>, one could definitely create a Web site that accepted a user's zip code and
produced a sample ballot with links to all the candidates' Web sites.
"' For example, all of the candidates running for a particular Senate seat might agree
to establish a Web site at, say, "www.ohio-senate.com," which then would link to each of the
individual campaign home pages.
' Recall the same example discussed earlier: Fidelity Investments and Fidelity National
both sought 'fidelity.com." See supra note 101.
' See International Al Hoc Comm., Seven New Top Level Domain Names Are Added for
InternetAddresses and up to 28 New RegistrarsPlanned(Feb. 4, 1997) <http'//www.iahc.org/
press/press-final.html>; see also John C. Blattner, Internet Domain Names and Trademark
Rights: The Confusion is Likely to Get Worse Before It Gets Better, 76 MICH. B.J. 1344 (1997)
(describing the plan). In May 1997, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed by 80
Internet-related organizations, essentially adopting the IAHC proposal with certain
modifications. See Establishment of a Memorandum of Understandingon the Generic Top
Level Domain Name Space ofthe Internet DomainName System (gTLD-MOU) (Feb. 28,1997)
<http'//www.gtld.mou.orggTLD-MoU.html>.
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second-level domains, while each address would have a distinct toplevel suffix.344 Granted, to date the ".com" dominion has become
"an international marketplace teaming with cyberspace activity"
and the ".org" designation is next in line in terms of its desirability.3 45

However, given the rapid growth and structural change

now taking place on the Internet, users are likely to soon become
familiar with and adapt to the new gTLD's, hopefully without much
consumer confusion.
In the context of political campaigns, the InterNIC could
propagate a top-level domain such as ".campaign"-or perhaps for
particular races, ".prez," ".senate," ".congress," etc.-and restrict
registration to legitimate candidates.34 These new hierarchical
domain levels would represent the InterNIC's stamp of approval
that a particular Web page is indeed the official site of a legitimate
candidate.
The most basic private solution is simply to allow parties to
bargain among themselves for particular domain names. 7 So
long as property rights are clearly defined, parties can bid for them
in a developed aftermarket 1 8 To promote bargaining, the InterNIC could develop mechanisms or procedures to help domain name
owners buy and sell addresses. This would reduce transaction costs
by bringing parties together for mutually-beneficial exchanges." s

Thus, one of the Fidelities could take "fidelity.com" while the other settled for
"fidelity.biz." This often happens today, as many companies settle for ".org" addresses if the
.. com" address is already taken. Yet the ".org" suffix generally implies non-profit status.
Few would think to look for the McDonald's home page at "www.mcdonalds.org." Yet, once
citizens become accustomed to the ".bize suffix, it might well become as desirable as ".com."
Still, it is difficult to predict how rapidly Internet conventions and customs will evolve.
'
G. Andrew Barger, Cybermarks: A Proposed Hierarchical Modeling System of
Registrationand Internet Architecture for Domain Names, 29 JOHN MARSHALL L. REv. 623,
629 (1996).
3 6 It may be difficult to determine which candidates are legitimate. Obviously, ballot
access would not provide an appropriate test, as many candidates will desire Web sites
before officially declaring their candidacies, and in order to obtain their party's nomination.
This is one of many practical issues the InterNIC would have to struggle with in developing
a plan to deal with these issues.
'T See Easterbrook, supra note 326, at 213-16.
"

See id.

These markets already exist-where else-on the Internet. For a list of domain name
brokers on the Web, see Yahoo!, Yahoo! - Business and Economy:Companies:Internet
Seruices:Domain Registration:Brokerages(visited Mar. 20, 1998) <http'Jwww.yahoo.com
Business-and-Economy/Companies/Internet-Services/DomainRegistration/Brokerages>
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However, traditional bargaining problems, such as the possibility
of bilateral monopolies and the significant likelihood that political
opponents might refuse to negotiate in good faith, remain considerable.' ° Still, governmental or privately-created organizations
could strive to solve these difficulties.
C. TECHNOLOGICAL RESPONSES

There are two categories of technology-based responses to the
parody problem. First, the spoofed campaign itself could attempt
to exploit new Internet technologies to distinguish its Web site from
the parody, so that visitors would have no doubt as to which one
was the real thing. Currently, there are only so many things you
can do with a Web page, and most can be achieved by an Internet
novice. The great majority of 1996 candidate sites contained little
more than a few pictures, a handful of position statements, and an
occasional form that visitors could fill out to get more information
or to join an e-mail distribution list. As the Internet matures,
however, Web sites will soon include such features as two-way
video-conferencing, real-time audio Webcasting, and live animated
graphics. However, design and maintenance of these complicated
Web functions is certain to be more time consuming and expensive.
Thus, only well-funded organizations will be able to employ such
technologies. This will present campaigns with the opportunity to
distinguish themselves from the cheap knock-offs. Just as few
individuals have the ability or resources to create a professionallooking television commercial, high-quality Web sites may be
similarly difficult to duplicate in the near future.
Second, the industry could modify Web browsers and/or software
plug-ins 351 to incorporate site identification methods, such as the

(listing domain name brokers on the Web).
"' See Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEG. STUD. 1, 14-20 (1982) (discussing the
flaws with Coase's theorem).
"' Plug-ins are software programs that extend the capabilities of a World Wide Web
browser in a specific way. Currently, popular plug-ins include those which give browsers the
ability to play audio samples, view video streams, or develop 3-D animation. See Jules Allen,
Be Receptive to Browser Plug-ins, ST. PETERSBURG (FLA.) TIMES, Feb. 16, 1998, at 13;
Netscape Communications Corp., Navigator Plugins (visited Sept. 20, 1997) <http'J/
www.netscape.com/buy/misc/noplugins.html> (listing various popular plug-ins).
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certificate system developed to authenticate merchants' identities
for credit card purchases.352 This feature would allow users to
verify that a Web page is in fact a product of the acclaimed source.
Unfortunately, since anonymous speech cannot be outlawed except
in very limited situations,353 there is probably no way to legally
obligate Web site operators to identify themselves. Yet, if major
commercial and non-profit sites utilize this device to assure
netizens that their sites are legitimate, these online social norms
may well make it customary for visitors to check the authenticity
of Web sites.3 M Such a system would provide users with an
additional and theoretically superior source-denoting tool, thereby
reducing the likelihood of cyberspace confusion.
V1.

CONCLUSION

Parody is obviously a valuable technique for political expression.
Throughout the history of our nation, this expressive device has
been utilized as an entertaining and attention-grabbing form of
social commentary. Parody can also be highly effective. One need
32 See Kelly Kunsch, Diogenes Wanders the Superhighway:A Proposalfor Authentication
of Publicly Disseminated Documents on the Internet, 20 SEATrLE U. L. REV. 749, 760-61
(1997) (discussing the use of the Internet to conduct research on authentication problems
that may arise); Verisign, DigitalIDs for Servers:High-Level Security at a Low Cost (visited
Mar. 20, 1998) <http'ilwww.verisign.com/products/sites/severauth.html>; Verisign, Verisign
Digital ID Center (visited Mar. 20, 1998) <httpJ/digitalid.verisign.com/idintro.htm>. A few
states have passed digital signature acts to establish authorities that will issue "certificates"
to verify the authenticity of online information. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'r CODE § 16.5 (West
Supp. 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 282.70 to .75 (Harrison Supp. 1996).
See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (holding that the freedom
to publish anonymously is protected by the First Amendment).
"' Even if a Web site operator does not initially desire to participate in the site
identification system, if the Web community as a whole begins to adopt the site identification
system, there may be social pressures on non-participants to join the system. Once a
majority of Web sites adopt site identification methods, and browsers can be configured to
signal or avoid sites that do not identify themselves, the non-participants will have an
incentive to identify themselves, for if they do not they will lose viewers. This is similar to
the system of social control generated by the advent of the V-chip, which may be used to
coerce television broadcasters into rating their programs. Once the V-chip becomes
commonplace in American society, it can be used to screen out programs that the
broadcasters refuse to rate. This creates incentives for broadcasters to rate their programs,
as they will soon realize that their own ratings will fall if they refuse to participate in the
system. See J.M. Balkin, Media Filters, the V.chip, and the Foundations of Broadcast
Regulation, 45 DUKE L.J. 1131, 1164 (1996).
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only consider the success of Saturday Night Live in portraying
Gerald Ford as a bumbling fool, Jimmy Carter as a technical

wizard, and Ross Perot as a fast-talking, clich6-wielding crackpot
to recognize the power of parody and satire. 5 However, in many
instances, the victims of parody find this method of poking fun to
be no joke at all. There is a fine line between amusing social
commentary and confusing the general public. Courts are often
called upon to determine whether such efforts have induced

actionable harms, regardless of their entertainment and social
value.3 56
As a medium for social intercourse, the Internet is far from ready
to assume its role as the savior of American democracy. Despite
the promise of low-cost, worldwide political dialogue, there is
currently too much chaos in cyberspace to allow an individual to
effectively promote political ideas using the World Wide Web alone.
Perhaps the Net will never attain its anticipated position as the
Yet, given the Internet's
epicenter of political discourse. 7
growing importance in American culture and the fact that using it
is a bargain as compared to the cost of television advertising,
politicians are unlikely to end their courtship of netizens any time
in the near future. Thus, a political campaign will be forced to deal
with the parodies, the attacks, the domain-hijackers, and the cyber-

squatters. Given current trends, however, by the 2000 election, the
law may be squarely on the politician's side.

"6 See THE BEST OF SATURDAY NIGHT LIVE: SNL PRESIDENTIAL BASH (Anchor Bay
Entertainment, Inc. 1992).
' Many courts have held that poking fun at a trademark can be no laughing matter.
See, e.g., Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997)
(holding that an injunction entered against the defendant publisher's book, which was
substantially similar to Dr. Seuss Enterprises's copyrighted work, was not overly broad), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 27 (1997); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications, 28 F.3d 769, 31
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1246 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding parodist liable for confusion that existed
between an ad parody in a humor magazine and Anheuser-Busch's trademark); Hard Rock
Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Pacific Graphics, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 1454, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1368
(W.D. Wash. 1991) (determining that the defendant's "Hard Rain" logo infringed the famous
"Hard Rock" mark); Nabisco Brands, Inc. v. Kaye, 760 F. Supp. 25, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1465 (D. Conn. 1991) (forbidding use of "A.2" as a mark for a meat sauce); Gucci Shops, Inc.
v. R.H. Macy & Co., 446 F. Supp. 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (enjoining sales of a diaper bag with
green and red bands and the wording "Gucchi Goo").
' Cf ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 86-88 (1960) (decrying the failure
of radio communication to "cultivatle] those qualities of taste, of reasoned judgment, of
integrity, of loyalty, of mutual understanding upon which the enterprise of self-government
depends" because it became too engaged in making money).
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Most likely, it will not be a parody case that determines the
boundaries of free speech on the Internet. Rather, the Supreme
Court's decision in Reno v. ACLU will probably set the stage for
numerous lower court decisions that determine who can stop what
types of online behavior. 58 However, while halting the dissemination of child pornography is certainly a laudable goal, there is
significant danger in allowing this decision alone to define the
limits of Internet speech. What may be appropriate paternalism in
one context can have damaging effects in another. When legal
rules are fashioned too broadly, they may later be construed to
burden certain forms of speech or behavior never contemplated by
those who designed them. Furthermore, not every problem
requires a legal remedy; in the absence of legal rules, individuals
will pursue their own private and collective solutions. Particularly
where judges and legislators are unfamiliar with the medium, they
should defer to society and technology for the answers.
For now, there is little cause for alarm. The hypothetical case
put forth in this Article would probably never be litigated in the
real world. Even if it were, as noted throughout this Article, judges
retain enormous flexibility to manipulate legal rules in order to
reach just outcomes and to protect free speech. Nevertheless, at
least with respect to trademark issues, Internet law is clearly
headed in a disturbing direction. Under current doctrine, merely
registering a domain name can trigger the Lanham Act's "in
commerce" requirement. Moreover, Internet users are generally
assumed to be unsophisticated and easily victimized by online
confusion.359 While these rules may help courts punish cybersquatters, one can also extend these precedents to cases in which
significant free speech rights are at stake. Although the privacy,
publicity, and election laws have yet to undergo similar refinement
to allow them to reach Internet abuses, similar dangers exist in
these contexts as well. Broad interpretation and manipulation of
existing legal rules can provide judges with a wider net that might
help them catch more wrongdoers; however, it is imperative that
authorities take into account the innocent victims that newlyexpanded legal doctrines will inevitably snare.

" 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
'

See supra Section III.A.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol5/iss2/6

70

Oram: Will the Real Candidate Please Stand Up?: Political Parody On the

19981

POLITICAL PARODY

537

Perhaps the parody problem is just a pothole along the Information Superhighway. Coase, of course, would tell us that when legal
rights are clearly defined, the parties will simply bargain their
disputes away.160 However, the issue does highlight the Internet's predicament: too much speech, too much chaos, and too many
lawyers who think they have all the answers. Legal remedies and
administrative intervention may or may not be an appropriate way
to deal with these issues. Thomas Jefferson once warned that
"laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of
the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths disclosed ...
institutions must advance also, and keep pace with the times."36 '
Yet at what point do we abandon our faith in the capability of our
existing institutions to keep pace with technological advances?
These problems are not easy; simple answers will likely turn out to
be setbacks, not solutions. Thus, rather than make unwise ad hoc
decisions, judges and legislators must give serious consideration to
the consequences of the legal rules they create. Having done so,
they should be willing to defer to non-legal solutions until they can
be sure that the laws they make will not produce such unfortunate
effects.

31

See generally Coase, supra note 336 (proclaiming the virtues of private bargaining).
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in CITIZEN

JEFFERSON: THE WIT AND WISDOM OF AN AMERICAN SAGE 84, 85 (John P. Kaminski ed.,
1994).
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